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I.  INTRODUCTION 
The Supreme Court has recently decided a number of cases involving 
the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA).1  In 2000, the Court issued its 
opinion in Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Environmental Services.2  
In 2001, it decided Solid Waste Agency of Northern Cook County v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers.3  In 2002, Borden Ranch Partnership v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Engineers evenly divided the Court, four-to-four with 
Justice Kennedy not participating.4  And in 2004, the Court decided 
South Florida Water Management District (SFWMD) v. Miccosukee 
Tribe of Indians.5  In 2006, the Supreme Court will hear three cases 
involving the CWA.  Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers and 
United States v. Rapanos are cases from the Sixth Circuit that involve 
wetlands and the jurisdictional touchstone “navigable waters.”6  The 
S.D. Warren Co. v. Board of Environmental Protection is a case from the 
state of Maine that involves the regulation of a hydroelectric dam and 
the CWA jurisdictional requirement of “discharge.”7  These cases are a 
reliable barometer of the importance as well as the controversy 
surrounding the recent application of various aspects of the CWA. 
In 1987, Congress amended the CWA for the purpose of expressly 
bringing industrial and municipal separate storm sewer system discharges 
within the scope of the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System 
 1. Clean Water Act §§ 101-607, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1387 (2000).  The CWA is 
commonly cited to both its original section numbers and the official code.   
 2. Friends of the Earth, Inc. v.  Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc.,  528 U.S. 167 (2000) 
(interpreting  the “citizen suit” provisions of CWA § 505). 
 3. Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001) (considering the Corps’ CWA § 404 jurisdiction over “isolated 
wetlands” under the Migratory Bird rule); see also infra note 35. 
 4. Borden Ranch P’ship v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 537 U.S. 99 (2002) 
(dealing with CWA section 404 discharges). 
 5. S. Fla. Water Mgmt. Dist. v. Miccosukee Tribe of Indians, 541 U.S. 95 (2004) 
(construing the “addition of pollutants” requirement of CWA section 502(12)). 
 6. Carabell v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 391 F.3d 704 (6th Cir. 2004) cert. 
granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2005) (No. 04-1384); U.S. v. Rapanos, 376 
F.3d 629 (6th Cir. 2004) cert. granted, 74 U.S.L.W. 3228 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2005) (No. 
04-1034). 
 7. S.D. Warren Co. v. Bd. of Envtl. Prot., 868 A.2d 210 (Me. 2005) cert. granted 
in part, 73 U.S.L.W. 3686 (U.S. Oct. 11, 2005). 
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(NPDES) permit program.8  Although the amendments were adopted 
almost twenty years ago, the application of the municipal separate storm 
water law has proven controversial at both the federal9 and state levels.10  
The controversy is likely to continue for two reasons: Urban runoff is a 
leading source of water quality impairment today, and the economic 
stakes of addressing the problem or failing to address it are significant.11
The term “municipal separate storm sewer system (MS4)”12 describes 
a storm water conveyance system from the point of storm water 
collection through the point of its discharge to the receiving waters.13  
The term “MS4” is broadly inclusive, and is not simply limited to city 
owned storm sewer systems. 14  The regulation of MS4s lies at the heart 
of the water quality controversy considered in this article. 
The CWA requires municipal storm water discharge permits to 
include provisions that control discharges both “into” and “from” the 
MS4.  With respect to discharges “into” the conveyance system, MS4 
permits are required to “effectively prohibit” non-storm water discharges.15  
 8. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000). 
 9. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999); Envtl. Def. 
Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 382 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004); and 
City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 10. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 128 (Ct. App. 2004), reh’g denied, Jan. 4, 2005. 
 11. See discussion infra Part III; see also The National Water Quality Inventory 
Report to Congress for 1988, 65 Fed. Reg. 43,586, 43,587 (July 13, 2000). 
 12. The CWA does not define the term “municipal separate storm sewer.”  
However, it is defined in the storm water regulations at 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(8) (2004): 
Municipal separate storm sewer means a conveyance or system of conveyances 
(including roads with drainage systems, municipal streets, catch basins, curbs, 
gutters, ditches, man-made channels, or storm drains): 
(i) Owned or operated by a State, city, town, borough, county, parish, district, 
association, or other public body (created by or pursuant to State law) having 
jurisdiction over disposal of sewage, industrial wastes, storm water, or other 
wastes, including special districts under State law such as a sewer district, 
flood control district or drainage district, or similar entity, or an Indian tribe or 
an authorized Indian tribal organization, or a designated and approved 
management agency under section 208 of the CWA that discharges to waters 
of the United States; 
(ii) Designed or used for collecting or conveying storm water; 
(iii) Which is not a combined sewer; and 
(iv) Which is not part of a Publicly Owned Treatment Works (POTW) as 
defined at 40 C.F.R [§] 122.2. 
 13. As used in this Article, the term “receiving waters” includes creeks, streams, 
rivers, lakes, reservoirs, estuaries, bays, and the ocean. 
 14. See discussion infra Part III.   
 15. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(ii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(ii) (2000). 




With respect to discharges “from” the storm sewer system, MS4 permits 
are required to reduce pollutants to the “maximum extent practicable” 
(MEP).16  They are also required to comply with “such other provisions 
as the Administrator or the State determines appropriate for the control 
of such pollutants.” 17
The purpose of this Article is to analyze whether MEP is the exclusive 
statutory standard under the CWA for discharges “from” an MS4 
conveyance system.  As discussed below, the issue is relevant because 
some states are beginning to require compliance with state water quality 
standards (WQS) independent of MEP.18  While questions of constitutional 
law exist with respect to the analysis of MS4 storm water regulation,19 
my inquiry is focused on the role that WQS should play in implementing 
the provisions of the CWA. 
 16. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (2000). 
The EPA has identified the following factors as relevant to the MEP standard: (1) storm 
water discharge size; (2) climate; (3) implementation schedules; (4) current ability to 
finance the program; (5) hydrology; (6) capacity to perform operation and maintenance; 
(7) conditions of receiving waters; and (8) other specific local concerns and aspects 
included in a comprehensive watershed plan.  National Pollution Discharge Elimination 
System-Regulations for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing 
Storm Water Discharges, Part II, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,754 (Dec. 8, 1999) [Phase 2 
Storm Water Rules]. 
 17. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(iii) (2000). 
 18. Under federal law, the following elements must be included in each state’s 
WQS submitted to the EPA for review: 
(a) Use designations consistent with the provisions of sections 101(a)(2) and 
303(c)(2) of the Clean Water Act; (b) Methods used and analyses conducted to 
support water quality standards revisions; (c) Water quality criteria sufficient 
to protect the designated uses; (d) An antidegradation policy consistent with 
[40 C.F.R. ] § 131.12; (e) Certification by the State Attorney General or other 
appropriate legal authority within the State that the water quality standards 
were duly adopted pursuant to State law; [and] (f) General information which 
will aid the Agency in determining the adequacy of the scientific basis of the 
standards which do not include the uses specified in section 101(a)(2) of the 
[CWA] as well as information on general policies applicable to State standards 
which may affect their application and implementation. 
40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2004).  The water quality criteria may be expressed in narrative or 
numeric terms.  40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (2004).  On the one hand, a typical narrative 
criterion might be that “all waters shall be maintained free of toxic substances in 
concentrations that are toxic to, or that produce detrimental physiological responses in 
human, plant, animal, or aquatic life.” WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN, SAN DIEGO 
BASIN (9), 3-15/16.  On the other hand, a typical numeric criterion would be expressed as 
a quantitative limitation on pollutant concentrations or levels. 
WQS are federally required.  The formulation of WQS is generally within the province 
of the states, but the EPA is obligated to promulgate WQS when a state fails to do so or 
inadequately does so.  Clean Water Act § 303 (c)(3)-(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (c)(3)-(4) 
(2000).  Therefore, WQS should be considered part of the federal mandate of the CWA 
when they are imposed on permittees pursuant to the discretionary authority to control 
storm water discharges. 
 19. City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2003) (rejecting plaintiffs’ 
Tenth and First Amendment claims that the MS4 permit was unconstitutional). 
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I argue that the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), as well 
as those states authorized to administer the NPDES program, possess the 
discretionary authority to prohibit MS4 discharges that cause or 
contribute to a violation of WQS, and that such a prohibition ought to be 
included in MS4 permits in order to protect a receiving waterbody’s 
water quality.  As a result, MEP should not be construed to act as a legal 
ceiling that prevents regulators from imposing this type of permit 
prohibition.20  I maintain that this view is consistent with the discretionary 
grant of power given by Congress to the EPA and to the states. 
I also argue that prohibiting MS4 discharges that cause or contribute 
to a violation of WQS is desirable as a matter of public policy.  At a 
theoretical level, this view is consistent with the traditional role of WQS 
as an ambient-based reference point for protecting a waterbody’s 
beneficial uses.  This view is also desirable at a practical level because 
WQS give regulators and the regulated community a clearer standard for 
assessing permit compliance than the more illusive MEP standard.  
Consequently, using WQS as a reference point to assess permit 
compliance is apt to be more protective of water quality than using MEP 
as the sole governing standard. 
The proper interpretation of the CWA provisions applicable to 
MS4 regulation has fomented controversy because the economic21 
 20. The argument that MS4 permits should prohibit discharges that cause or 
contribute to a violation of WQS is premised on scientific soundness of the WQS itself.  
To the extent the WQS are not scientifically supported, they should be revised.  The 
procedure for reviewing WQS exists.  According to federal law, states are required to 
review WQS every three years.  Clean Water Act § 303(c)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(1) 
(2000). 
 21. The preamble to the Phase II regulations has a discussion of the cost-benefit 
analysis conducted by the EPA for implementing Phase II.  The EPA estimates that the 
total average annual per household cost of the rule is expected to be $9.16.  64 Fed. Reg. 
68,791 (Dec. 8, 1999).  In doing the cost-benefit analysis for Phase II, the EPA also 
looked at the costs incurred by thirty-five Phase I MS4s.  The average annual per 
household cost for Phase I MS4s was found to be $9.08.  64 Fed. Reg. 68,792 (Dec. 8, 
1999). 
The Los Angeles Water Quality Control Board considered costs in Review and 
Analysis of Budget Data Submitted by the Permittees for Fiscal Years 2000-2003.  It 
reports that in Los Angeles County,  
the average combined household cost, based on the reported budgets is in the 
range of $50 to $63 per year.  Using the assumption of segregating the budgets 
into pre-existing programs and expenditures to implement the storm water 
program, the average cost per household per year goes down to $12.50 - $18 
for implementing the new programs required by the municipal permits.  
Dan Radulescu & Xavier Swamikannu, Review and Analysis of Budget Data Submitted 
by the Permittees for Fiscal Years 2000-2003 17 (Jan. 13, 2003), available at  




and environmental stakes22 are high to the various stakeholders.  The 
operator of the storm water conveyance system, the MS4 permittee, has 
the primary responsibility for complying with the terms of the permit.  
As such, the operator is obviously concerned with the cost of regulatory 
compliance.  For most local governments, the cost of compliance must 
be balanced against the demand for a wide range of competing public 
services.  Moreover, the permit requirements must be met by many local 
governments at a time of pinched financial resources.  The building industry 
also is an interested stakeholder in the outcome.  Its members are less 
directly affected than MS4 permittees because construction activities are 
subject to regulation under the industrial storm water permit requirements 
of the CWA which have a WQS requirement.23  Nevertheless, the building 
industry is concerned with the financial impact of MS4 storm water 
regulation because most completed development projects discharge 
“into” the storm water conveyance system.  Consequently, local government 
and the building industry have a keen interest in the statutory fit between 
MEP and WQS.  To the extent that the compliance bar is set too high, 
actions to enforce an MS4 permit may result, including the imposition of 
significant financial penalties for noncompliance.24
Regulators and environmentalists are equally concerned with whether 
WQS may be used.  As examined more fully below, discharges from 
an MS4 are an important source of water quality impairment.25  
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/losangeles/html/programs/stormwater/la_ms4_final/03_0
114_MS4costjan2003.pdf. 
State Board Order No. 2000-11, which addressed the Los Angeles Water Quality 
Control Board’s Standard Urban Storm Water Mitigation Plan (SUSMP) requirements 
only, makes limited findings regarding the cost of implementing the SUSMP 
requirements.  It states “the Regional Board found that the cost to include BMPs that will 
meet the mitigation criteria will be one to two percent of the total development cost.  
This amount appears to be reasonable . . . .”  See State Board Order No. 2000-11, 
available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/resdec/wqorders/2000/wqo2000-011.doc. 
An alternate approach is to consider the economic costs of failing to protect a 
receiving water’s water quality.  This approach is difficult because, among other reasons, 
the costs are not easily monetized.  Nevertheless, one approach might be to consider the 
estimates for correcting water quality impairment after it occurs.  The TMDL program, 
discussed infra in Part VII. E. 5, deals with rectifying water quality impairments.  TMDL 
cost estimates are somewhere in the range of $25 to $50 billion over fifteen years.  See 
OLIVER A. HOUCK, THE CLEAN WATER ACT TMDL PROGRAM: LAW, POLICY, AND 
IMPLEMENTATION 178 ( 2d ed. 2002). 
 22. See discussion infra Part III. 
 23. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3) (2000); see also 40 
C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14)(x) (2003). 
 24. The CWA intends to deter conduct and ensure compliance by establishing civil 
and criminal penalties.  Clean Water Act § 309(b)-(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b)-(c) (2000).  
Civil penalties may be substantial.  Under CWA section 309(g)(2)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 
1319(g)(2)(B) (2000), they may be up to $10,000 per day for each violation and for each 
day during which the violation continues. 
 25. See discussion infra Part III. 
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Development projects generally tend to create more impervious surface 
areas, such as roads, driveways, and sidewalks.  In doing so, they 
exacerbate municipal storm water runoff flows, which in turn threaten 
the water quality of local receiving waters.  Few, if any, citizens want to 
recreate in polluted waters or live near them.  Thus, prohibiting 
discharges that violate WQS tends to be more protective of water quality 
than MEP. 
The federal law governing MS4 regulation is found in section 402(p) 
of the CWA.26  While this section clearly provides that MS4 permits 
“shall require” controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the MEP, 
Congress did not define MEP or expressly mention WQS.27  The EPA’s 
Phase II storm water regulations offer the following explanation for 
Congress’s failure to define MEP:28  “There is no regulatory definition 
of MEP in order to allow the permitting authority and regulated MS4s 
maximum flexibility in their interpretation of it.”29  Unfortunately, 
this desire to promote flexibility creates a breeding ground for legal 
disagreement as well as regulatory uncertainty.  The dynamics for the 
“perfect legal storm” are further aided by the potential clash of divergent 
interests amongst the interested stakeholders—local government, the 
building industry, environmentalists, and regulators. 
II.  AN OVERVIEW OF THE CLEAN WATER ACT (CWA) 
In order to properly understand and apply section 402(p) to MS4 
regulation, one should have a structural understanding of the CWA.  As 
the principal federal statute dealing with the regulation of water 
 26. Clean Water Act § 402(p), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p) (2000). 
 27. Id. 
 28. In 1999, the EPA promulgated a final administrative “Phase II Rule” 
mandating that discharges from small municipal separate storm sewer systems and from 
construction sites between one and five acres in size be subject to the permitting 
requirements of the NPDES program.  See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 
(9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 U.S. 1085 (2004) (generally affirming the Phase II 
rules against statutory, administrative, and constitutional challenges, but remanding the 
case to correct procedural defects in the general permit program).  The “Phase II Rule” 
was the second stage of EPA’s two-phase storm water rulemaking effort.  The “Phase I 
Rule,” governing larger-scale storm water discharges, was issued in 1990.  Amended 
regulations were issued by the EPA in 1991.  See John H. Minan, Municipal Storm 
Water Permitting in California, 40 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245, 246 (2003). 
 29. EPA, STORM WATER PHASE II COMPLIANCE ASSISTANCE GUIDE § 4.6.1. (March 
2000); see discussion of Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County infra Part VII. 




pollution in the United States,30 it anticipates a working partnership 
between the federal government and the states.31  The goal of this 
partnership is “to restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and 
biological integrity of the Nation’s waters.”32  This overarching objective of 
protecting water quality must be borne in mind as one grapples with the 
proper application of the storm water provisions. 
Additional points are useful to appreciate.  Section 30133 of the CWA 
prohibits the discharge of pollutants into navigable waters unless the 
discharge is authorized by a properly issued permit pursuant to section 
40234 or 404.35  The guiding principle is that unless authorized by a 
properly issued permit, the discharge of pollutants to waters of the 
United States is prohibited. 
The CWA contains various regulatory programs.  Depending on the 
particular program involved, its provisions are administered at the 
federal level either by the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) 
or the Army Corps of Engineers.36  The CWA also authorizes the EPA to 
allow the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
permit issuing responsibilities, including those involving the regulation 
of storm water, to be undertaken by a state providing it has an EPA 
approved permit program.37  This administrative structure is significant 
to understand because section 402(p) speaks in terms of action either by 
the “Administrator”38 or the “State.” 39
 30. The other dominant federal statute dealing with water quality, the Safe 
Drinking Water Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 300f to j-9 (2000), directs the EPA to set primary and 
secondary maximum levels for contaminants in public drinking water systems. 
 31. City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657, 659 (5th Cir. 2003). 
 32. Clean Water Act § 101(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 33. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). 
 34. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C § 1342 (2000) (National Pollutant Discharge 
Elimination System (NPDES)). 
 35. Clean Water Act § 404, 33 U.S.C. § 1344 (2000) (permits for dredge or fill 
material). 
 36. Section 404 gives the Corps the responsibility for issuing permits for the 
discharge of dredge or fill materials into navigable waters.  Clean Water Act § 404(a), 33 
U.S.C. § 1344(a) (2000).  The legislative history to the CWA reveals this was done for 
two reasons.  First, the Corps already administered the wetlands regulatory program 
under the Rivers and Harbors Act.  Under this Act, the Corps originally acted to protect 
only navigation and navigable capacity.  In 1968, the Corps expanded its permit review 
process to include, among other things, environmental concerns related to impacts on 
fish and wildlife and pollution.  See Zabel v. Tabb, 430 F.2d 199 n.27 (5th Cir. 1970), 
cert. denied, 401 U.S. 910 (1971); see also U.S. v. Alaska, 503 U.S. 569, 580-81, 583 
(1992).  Second, the Corps did not want its extensive dredging and filling activities to be 
regulated by another federal agency.  See Jennifer Ruffolo, The U.S. Supreme Court 
Limits Federal Regulation of Wetlands, 33 CAL. RESEARCH BUREAU 02-003 (Feb. 2002).  
 37. Clean Water Act § 402(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(b) (2000).  The CWA also 
authorizes state administration of section 404 permitting.  Clean Water Act § 404(g), 33 
U.S.C. § 1344(g) (2000). 
 38. Clean Water Act § 101(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d) (2000). 
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Most states have approved NPDES program authority, which is 
subject to continuing administrative oversight by the EPA.40  This 
delegation, which allows a state to preserve its autonomy and to avoid 
direct regulation by the federal government,41 means that those states 
administering the storm water provisions of the CWA are likely to be at 
the forefront of the regulatory effort. 
The trigger to the NPDES permit requirements is the “discharge of a 
pollutant,” which is broadly defined by the CWA as “any addition of any 
pollutant to navigable waters from any point source.”42  The dominant water 
quality strategy of the NPDES permit program43 is the application of 
uniform effluent limits to the point of discharge, the so-called “end-of-pipe” 
discharge, to the navigable waters.44  But the NPDES program also employs 
 39. Clean Water Act § 502, 33 U.S.C. § 1362(3) (2000) (defining the meaning of 
the term “state”). 
 40. The following states have approved programs: Alabama; Arizona; Arkansas; 
California; Colorado; Connecticut; Delaware; Florida; Georgia; Hawaii; Illinois; Indiana; 
Iowa; Kansas; Kentucky; Louisiana: Maine; Maryland; Michigan; Minnesota; Mississippi; 
Missouri; Montana; Nebraska; Nevada; New Jersey; New York; North Carolina; North 
Dakota; Ohio; Oklahoma; Oregon; Pennsylvania; Rhode Island; South Carolina; South 
Dakota; Tennessee; Texas; Utah; Vermont; Virginia; Washington; West Virginia; Wisconsin; 
Wyoming.  U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System: 
State Program Status, available at http://cfpub2.epa.gov/npdes/statestats.cfm (last visited 
Sept. 22, 2004). 
 41. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13370(c) (West 1992). 
It is in the interest of the people of the state, in order to avoid direct regulation 
by the federal government of persons already subject to regulation under state 
law pursuant to this division, to enact this chapter in order to authorize the 
state to implement the provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act 
and acts amendatory thereof or supplementary thereto, and federal regulations 
and guidelines issued pursuant thereto, provided, that the state board shall 
request federal funding under the Federal Water Pollution Control Act for the 
purpose of carrying out its responsibilities under this program. 
See also CAL. WATER CODE § 13399.43 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005) (Storm Water 
Enforcement Act of 1998). 
 42. Clean Water Act § 502(12), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(12) (2000).  Section 1362(14) 
(2000) defines the term “point source” to mean “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, 
well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal feeding 
operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are or may be 
discharged.”  The term “pollutant” is broadly defined in CWA section 502(6), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(6) (2000). 
 43. Clean Water Act §§ 302, 303, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1312, 1313 (2000).  NPDES 
permits structurally include various components: (1) technology-based effluent limits; 
(2) water quality-based limits; (3) monitoring and reporting requirements; and (4) 
standard and special conditions.  The principal focus in this article is on WQS (water 
quality-based limits). 
 44. The NPDES permit program applies to all pollutant discharges into “navigable 




the strategy of ambient WQS,45 which are functionally geared to 
protecting the beneficial uses of the receiving water. 
States have the primary responsibility to establish WQS.46  WQS are 
periodically reviewed both by the states and by the EPA to insure that 
they are kept current.  Therefore, WQS are not static, but rather are 
dynamic in nature.47
As a general matter, WQS impose legal requirements that must be 
implemented through appropriate regulatory action.48  As such, WQS 
waters,” which are defined to mean “waters of the United States, including the territorial 
seas.”  Clean Water Act § 502(7), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(7) (2000).  CWA jurisdiction is 
based on the authority of Congress under the Commerce Clause, U.S. CONST., art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3.  The precise reach of the CWA pursuant to the Commerce Clause has not been 
answered by the Supreme Court, although it has given guidance on the Commerce 
Clause in United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), and United States v. Lopez, 
514 U.S. 549 (1995).  In Solid Waste Agencies of N. Cook County (SWANCC) v. U.S. 
Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159 (2001), the Supreme Court refused to address the 
constitutional reach of the Commerce Clause, holding instead that Congress, as a matter 
of statutory construction, did not intend the CWA to extend to isolated wetlands that 
provide habitat for migratory birds.  In United States  v. Riverside Bayview Homes, Inc., 
474 U.S. 121 (1985), the Supreme Court held that the CWA applies to wetlands adjacent 
to navigable waters.  The Court reasoned that Congress evidenced its intent to regulate 
some waters that would not be deemed “navigable” under the classical understanding of 
the term. 
 45. Section 402(a)(2) states that the “Administrator shall prescribe conditions for 
such permits to assure compliance with the requirements of paragraph (1) [section 
402(a)(1)].”  Clean Water Act § 402(a)(2), 33 U.S.C. 1342(a)(2) (2000).   Paragraph (1) 
requires compliance with provisions of section 301, which contains the WQS 
requirements.  Section 301 directs, among other things, achievement of “any more 
stringent limitation, including those necessary to meet water quality standards” 
established by state law.  Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) 
(2000). 
 46. Clean Water Act § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2000). 
 47. Id. (“at least once each three year period”).  States administering the provisions 
of the CWA are required to have a planning process, called the Triennial Review, to 
review WQS and to revise them as needed.  See, e.g., CAL WATER CODE § 13240.  This 
process of review may or may not result in a formal change to the WQS.  To the extent 
that WQS are considered infeasible or otherwise objectionable, an MS4 permittee or 
other interested party would have the opportunity to object to its application during the 
review process.  An unfavorable administrative decision to revise the WQS may be 
subject to judicial review. 
 48. See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE § 13263 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005), which 
requires the implementation of water quality control plans, also known as Basin Plans.  
CAL. WATER CODE section 13242 (West 1992 & Supp. 2005) requires that a program of 
implementation for achieving water quality objectives shall include, but not be limited 
to: (1) a description of the nature of actions which are necessary to achieve the 
objectives, including recommendations for appropriate action by any entity, public or 
private; (2) a time schedule for the actions to be taken; and (3) a description of 
surveillance to be undertaken to determine compliance with objectives.  Although 
adopted regionally by Regional Water Quality Control Boards, Basin Plans are subject to 
approval by both the State Water Resources Control Board [CAL. WATER CODE § 13245 
(West 1992 & Supp. 2005)] and the EPA [§ 1313 (2000)]. 
Once approved, the WQS are implemented through federal NPDES permits or state 
Waste Discharge Requirement permits pursuant to CAL. WATER CODE section 13260 
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perform several policy functions.  First, they act as a type of water quality 
control insurance policy.  This is necessary because the predominant 
strategy, which is control through uniform technology-based effluent 
limits,49 is not always sufficient to protect water quality.  The reason is 
straightforward: Such limits do not consider the ambient impact of 
the waste discharge to the receiving water.  A discharger may meet 
technology-based effluent limits contained in an NPDES permit, but this 
does not assure that water quality of the receiving water will not degrade 
or compromise its beneficial uses. Conceptually, WQS should be seen as 
acting in tandem with technology-based effluent limits to protect water 
quality. 
In short, WQS act as regulatory platforms50 for realizing the broad 
goals of protecting and maintaining the integrity of the nation’s waters.51  
While regulators need not use the full assimilative water quality capacity 
of their receiving waters,52 the CWA must be applied to avoid going 
beyond their capacity.  In this sense, WQS are an important water 
quality threshold that must be respected. 
(West 1992 & Supp. 2005).  Permits issued pursuant to the CWA are NPDES permits, 
whereas permits issued solely under state law are officially called a Waste Discharge 
Requirement (WDR).  Among other reasons, the distinction between NPDES permits 
and WDR permits is relevant because California law expressly regulates discharges to 
ground water and other discharges not regulated by federal law.  CAL. WATER CODE § 
13050(e) (West 1992 & Supp. 2005).  In contrast, federal regulation under the CWA is 
jurisdictionally based on the Commerce Clause and tied to discharges to “navigable 
waters.” 
 49. Technology-based limits are established in accordance with various 
technologies, and  vary based on the type of pollutant involved, the kind of discharge, 
and whether the PS is new or already existing.  For example, new sources, are governed 
by the “best available demonstrated control technology.”  See Clean Water Act § 306 
(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1316(a)(1) (2000). 
 50. Water quality also is protected by the antidegradation requirement of the 
CWA.  Clean Water Act § 303(d)(4)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d)(4)(B) (2000).  It provides: 
For waters identified under paragraph (1)(A) where the quality of such waters 
equals or exceeds levels necessary to protect the designated use for such waters 
or otherwise required by applicable water quality standards, any effluent 
limitation based on a total maximum daily load or other waste load allocation 
established under this section, or any water quality standard established under 
this section, or any other permitting standard may be revised only if such 
revision is subject to and consistent with the antidegradation policy established 
under this section. 
Discharges of storm water are required to comply with the applicable antidegradation 
policies designed to protect water quality.  40 C.F.R. § 131.12 (2003); see also infra note 
82. 
 51. Clean Water Act § 101, 33 U.S.C. § 1251(a) (2000). 
 52. See, e.g., CAL .WATER CODE § 13263(b) (West 1992 & Supp. 2005). 




III.  STORM WATER RUNOFF AND THE THREAT TO WATER QUALITY 
For much of America’s history, the conventional attitude was that 
“dilution was the solution to pollution.”53  Direct discharge of a broad 
array of wastes to our nation’s waters was seen as a convenient and 
accepted method of disposal.  Waterways were treated as the “commons”54 
for the disposal of all types of unwanted waste, and the assimilative 
capacity of our waters was taken for granted. 
Not surprisingly, this view has changed.  The policy of “dilution as the 
solution,” which may have worked well at an earlier time in our nation’s 
history, has recognized physical limits.  When the industrial waste in 
Ohio’s Cuyahoga River caught fire in 1969,55 Congress was forced to 
take corrective steps. 
Uniform, national standards for water quality were desperately needed.  
In 1972, Congress finally responded by enacting the CWA.56  Point source 
(PS)57 discharges of waste from sewage treatment plants, industrial 
activities, and other discharging activities were subject to control through 
federally authorized permitting, monitoring, and reporting requirements.58
 53. As used in this Article, the term “pollution” is broadly defined to mean “the 
man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, physical, biological, and 
radiological integrity of water.”  Clean Water Act § 502(19), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(19) 
(2000).  The term “pollutant” includes sewage, chemical wastes, biological materials, 
heat, industrial, municipal and agricultural waste.  Clean Water Act § 502(6), 33 U.S.C. 
§ 1362(6) (2000). 
 54. This phenomenon is an illustration of “the tragedy of the commons” in which 
short-term individually rational behavior is ultimately detrimental to long-term interests.  
It happens when individuals waste public goods in the rush to consume them before 
others do.  See generally Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, SCIENCE, Dec. 
13, 1968, at 1244. 
 55. See ROBERT W. ADLER ET AL., THE CLEAN WATER ACT 20 YEARS LATER 5-6 
(1993).  In 1969, the Cuyahoga River in Cleveland, Ohio, coated with a slick of 
industrial waste, caught fire.  Congress responded to that dramatic event, and to others 
like it, by enacting the Clean Water Act.  Of course, this event is only one of many 
instances when the alarm bell has sounded.  See, e.g., Envtl. Def. Fund v. EPA, 598 F.2d 
62 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (discharging polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs) to the nation’s waters 
creates a serious risk of death for aquatic organisms and disease, particularly cancer, to 
humans). 
 56. The statutory roots of the CWA were the Rivers and Harbors Appropriation 
Act (commonly known as the Refuse Act), ch. 425, 30 Stat. 1151 (1899) (codified as 
amended at §§ 403-413 (2000)) and the Federal Water Pollution Act of 1948, ch. 758, 62 
Stat. 1155 (1948) (codified as amended at §§ 1251-1387 (2000)).  The Refuse Act was 
designed to free up transport by keeping “navigable waters” free of garbage, whereas the 
Federal Water Pollution Act placed primitive controls on the discharge of materials into 
“interstate waters.” 
 57. CWA defines a “point source” (PS) as “any discernible, confined and discrete 
conveyance,” including such physical structures as pipes or ditches.  Clean Water 
Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000). 
 58. Clean Water Act § 402, 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (2000) (provisions dealing with the 
issuance of National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permits). 
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The regulation of PS discharges has been an important success story.59  
Industrial pollution has plummeted and municipal waste loadings have 
dropped by nearly fifty percent, notwithstanding the increase in the number 
of people being served.60  By most standards of measurement—whether 
it be number of permitted dischargers, pounds of pollution abated, or 
streams improved—the CWA regulation of PS discharges has made an 
important contribution to improving the nation’s water quality.61
But regulating PS discharges is only part of the larger story to 
controlling water pollution.  The struggle to protect water quality demands 
continuing vigilance.  Nonpoint source (NPS) pollution has been recognized 
as an important part of the story today.62  Polluted storm water often 
begins its journey to the local receiving waters as an unregulated NPS.  
Once the runoff is collected and deposited in a separate storm water 
conveyance system, it normally is discharged to the receiving water 
from a PS, such as an outfall pipe, without the benefit of any pollution 
control treatment.  The discharge “from” the PS to the receiving water is 
the theoretical basis for MS4 regulation under the NPDES program. 
The need for effective storm water regulation is clear.  Storm water 
runoff has been characterized as being “comparable to, if not greater 
 59. One author recently observed that “available empirical evidence shows significant 
progress in reducing discharges of pollutants to U.S. waters over the past thirty years.”  
Robert W. Adler, The Two Lost Books in the Water Quality Trilogy: The Elusive Objectives 
of Physical and Biological Integrity, 33 ENVTL. L. 29, 48 (2003).  Another author 
challenges the perception that the CWA has been a success based on its general failure to 
accomplish most of its stated goals, including, for example, the zero-discharge of 
pollutants by 1985.  Lawrence S. Bazel, The Clean Water Act at Thirty: A Failure After 
All These Years?, 18 NATURAL RES. & ENV’T 46 (2003). 
 60. HOUCK, supra note 21, at 3. 
 61. Id. at 4. 
 62. While CWA section 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000) defines the term 
“point source” (PS), the CWA does not define the term “nonpoint source” (NPS).  It is 
defined by implication.  Any source not fitting within the definition of a PS is treated as an 
NPS.  Therefore, for general purposes, the universe of water pollution is defined by the 
categories PS and NPS.  See generally U.S. Envtl. Protection Agency, Nonpoint Source 
Program and Grants Guidance for Fiscal Year 1997 and Future Years, 
http://www.epa.gov/owow/nps/guide.html (last visited Sept. 15, 2004). 
One author has observed: “Although information on the contributions to pollution 
loadings is skimpy, various estimates suggest ‘that nonpoint sources account for up to 99 
percent of suspended solids and usually between 50 to 90 percent of other conventional 
pollutants.’  Even for toxics, the best estimates assign up to 50 percent of the problem to 
nonpoint sources.” WILLIAM H. RODGERS, JR.,  ENVIRONMENTAL LAW 292-94, (2d ed. 
1994).  This assessment is generally consistent with government reports that estimate 
that fifty percent of all water pollution comes from NPS.  See HOUCK, supra note 21, at 
46 n.172. 




than, contamination from industrial and sewage sources.”63  Storm sewer 
conveyance systems carry suspended metals, sediments, algae-promoting 
nutrients (especially, nitrogen and phosphorus), floatable trash, used 
motor oil, raw sewage, pesticides, and other toxic contaminants into 
local receiving waters across the United States.  Urban development, 
industrial and construction sites, and illegal discharges and unauthorized 
connections to storm water conveyance systems are all potential sources 
of contamination. 
The problem is a matter of pressing national concern.  More than a 
third of the nation’s rivers and almost half of our lakes do not meet 
WQS.64 Along the Mississippi River, for example, contaminated runoff 
has created a “dead zone” in the Gulf of Mexico, traceable to excess 
nutrient loading and accompanying decreases in oxygen, from runoff.  
This “dead zone,” which recently reached the size of the state of New 
Jersey, has resulted in dissolved oxygen levels below the level needed by 
fish and invertebrates, and has effectively created a smothering layer of 
pollution over the sea bottom.65
Every state and every major watershed in the United States is under 
similar assault from unregulated or under-regulated sources of runoff.66  
In northern Wisconsin the runoff assault is from dairy farms, in North 
Carolina it is from hogs, and in Oregon it is from clear-cutting of 
forests.67  Housing and urban development also contribute to the runoff 
problem in many watersheds throughout the nation.68  The environmental 
alarm bell is ringing.  California, for example, responded to the wake-up 
call when it declared that unregulated storm water runoff was a leading 
cause of contamination of the state’s surface and groundwater.69
 63. Richard G. Cohn-Lee & Diane M. Cameron, Urban Stormwater Runoff 
Contamination of the Chesapeake Bay: Sources and Mitigation, 14 ENVTL. PROF. 10, 10 
(1992); see also John H. Minan, Municipal Storm Water Permitting in California, 40 
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 245, 252-53 (2003). 
 64. Adler, supra note 59, at 49. 
 65. Carol Kaesuk Yoon, A ‘Dead Zone’ Grows in the Gulf of Mexico, N.Y. TIMES, 
Jan. 20, 1998, at F1. 
 66. Basing regulation on watershed principles is complicated by the fact that 
political boundaries and administrative institutions do not follow watershed ecosystems.  
In California, for example, the average county includes portions of six different 
watersheds.  John T. Woolley et al., The California Watershed Movement: Science and 
the Politics of Place, 42 NAT. RES. J.  133, 136 (2002). 
 67. HOUCK, supra note 21, at 4. 
 68. Id. 
 69. Storm Water Enforcement Act § 1, 1998 Cal. Stat. 998 (“The Legislature 
hereby finds and declares all of the following: (a) Unregulated storm water runoff is a 
leading cause of contamination of the state’s surface water and groundwater.”); see also 
State Water Resources Control Board & Regional Water Quality Control Boards, 
Strategic Plan 8 (Nov. 15, 2001), available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/strategicplan/01 
strategic_plan.pdf.
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Coastal waters are also under attack from the pollutants in runoff.  The 
Pew Oceans Commission Report recently confirmed the persistent 
nature of the runoff problem as a major threat to our oceans.70  Runoff 
from development in our coastal regions is leading to the decline of 
ocean wildlife and to the collapse of ocean ecosystems.  The report cites 
estimates that the oil running off our streets and driveways and flowing 
into the oceans is equal to an Exxon Valdez71 oil spill every eight 
months.72  The Commission also reports that more than 13,000 beaches 
were closed or under pollution advisories in 2001, an increase of twenty 
percent from the year 2000.73
Effectively controlling storm water runoff as a regulatory matter is 
challenging because it is inherently ubiquitous, diffuse,74 and dependant 
on ever changing weather patterns.  Storm water runoff cannot be easily 
captured or controlled at one location.75  Another consideration adds to 
the challenge: Dry-weather flows of runoff also find their way into the 
MS4 conveyance system.76  Economic and technical constraints, such as 
 70. Pew Oceans Commission, America’s Living Ocean: Charting a Course for Sea 
Change (May 2003), available at http:/www.pewtrusts.org/pdf/env_pew_oceans_ final_report.pdf. 
 71. In 1989, the grounding of the Exxon Valdez caused the release of over 11 
million gallons of oil in Alaska’s water and polluted some 1200 miles of shoreline.  
Largely in response to this event, Congress enacted the Oil Pollution Act of 1990 (OPA), 
which contains nine separate titles ranging from general provisions regarding oil 
pollution down to specific requirements. 33 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2761 (2000); see Oil 
Pollution Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-380, 104 Stat. 484 (1990). 
 72. Pew Oceans Commission, supra note 70.  The EPA estimates that American 
households generate 193 million gallons of used oil annually, some of which is 
improperly disposed of.  It estimates that households improperly dump the equivalent of 
17 Exxon Valdez oil spills each year.  Runoff: The number one source of water pollution 
may be a surprise, SIERRA STAR, July 9, 2003 at 1. 
 73. Pew Oceans Commission, supra note 70. 
 74. It is frequently maintained that NPS pollution is not subject to direct regulation 
by the CWA.  See, e.g., Or. Natural Desert Ass’n v. Dombek, 172 F.3d 1092, 1096 (9th 
Cir. 1998).  The statement is potentially misleading.  Storm water may start as an NPS, 
but once it becomes part of the MS4, it is subject to regulation under CWA section 
402(p)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342 (p)(3)(B)(ii)-(iii) (2000). 
 75. In certain instances, dry season “low flow” diversions to a community’s 
sanitary sewer system may be used.  These diversion systems tie the storm sewer system 
to the sanitary conveyance system.  They divert untreated “low flows” into the sanitary 
sewer system where the flow then is treated to CWA standards before being discharged.  
“Low flows” include flows during dry weather periods and non-treated sanitary sewer 
overflows that reach the storm sewer system.  When “high flows” occur, typically during 
sustained rain events, the “low flow” diversion systems shut down to avoid the capacity 
of the sanitary sewer system from being overwhelmed.  Thus, “low flow” diversions to 
the sanitary sewer are not a complete or comprehensive solution to the runoff problem. 
 76. Dry weather flows from the storm sewer system may occur when sanitary 




the limited processing capacity of publicly owned sewage treatment 
facilities, make comprehensive “end-of-pipe” treatment of these 
“separate” conveyance systems difficult, if not infeasible, in most 
areas.77
In response to the threats from unregulated storm water, the EPA 
promulgated storm water regulations in the 1970s and early 1980s.78  All 
point sources,79 including storm water discharges, were required to apply 
for NPDES permits.80  Yet little progress was made in actually 
controlling the pollutants in storm water discharges.  In 1985, for example, 
three-quarters of the states cited urban storm water runoff as a major 
cause of waterbody impairment, and forty percent reported construction 
site runoff as a major cause of impairment.81  The lack of tangible 
progress, combined with recognition of the importance of the storm 
water problem, prompted Congress to take action in 1987.  It added 
section 402(p) for the purpose of establishing a comprehensive approach 
to the regulation of storm water by industrial82 and by municipal storm 
water dischargers.83
IV.  WATER QUALITY STANDARDS (WQS) 
An analysis of the legal controversy involving MS4 regulation must 
begin with an understanding of WQS.  Both the Water Quality Act of 
196584 and the Water Quality Improvement Act of 197085 contemplated 
that waste discharges to the nation’s waters would not cause or contribute 
to the violation of WQS.  State and local officials, working in cooperation 
with federal officials, were expected to establish minimum WQS and to 
create pollution prevention and abatement implementation programs. 
sewer malfunctions and excess irrigation water enter the storm sewer system. 
 77. One article recently estimated the cost of treatment at $5 to $10 per person per 
day.  G. Fred Lee & Anne Jones-Lee, Regulating Water Quality Impacts, STORMWATER, 
July/Aug. 2004, available at http://www.stormh2o.com/sw_0407_regulating.html. 
 78. See 38 Fed. Reg. 13,530 (May 22, 1973); 41 Fed. Reg. 11,303 (Mar. 18, 1976); 
44 Fed. Reg. 32,854 (June 7, 1979); and 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998 (Sept. 26, 1984). 
 79. Clean Water Act § 502(14), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(14) (2000). 
 80. See 38 Fed. Reg. 13,530 (May 22, 1973); 41 Fed. Reg. 11,303 (Mar. 18, 1976); 
44 Fed. Reg. 32,854  (June 7, 1979); and 49 Fed. Reg. 37,998 (Sept. 26, 1984). 
 81. Regulation for Revision of the Water Pollution Control Program Addressing 
Storm Water, 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,724, 68,727 (Dec. 8, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 9, 122, 123, and 124). 
 82. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A) (2000).  
Discharges from industrial activities are described in 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(b)(14) (2004). 
 83. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B) (2000). 
 84. Water Quality Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-234, 79 Stat. 903 (codified in 
scattered sections of 33 U.S.C.). The 1965 Act relied almost entirely on the states to 
improve water quality through the formulation of WQS. 
 85. Water Quality Improvement Act of 1970, 84 Stat. 91. 
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These early expectations proved largely ineffective for several 
reasons.  Investigators found the WQS approach to be weak, late in 
being developed and implemented, scientifically questionable, and 
generally unenforced by regulators.86  In general, the problem with WQS 
was traceable to two principal considerations.  First, the WQS often 
were expressed in generalized terms.  Water quality criteria stated in 
descriptive or narrative terms, such as “swimmable” or “fishable,” are 
inherently vague.  Too much room exists to debate the substantive content 
of the standard and its meaning.  This made enforcement problematic.  
Second, the ability of regulators to connect an NPS to the WQS 
impairment made determining accountability, and thus enforcement, 
difficult.  Because everyone arguably was to blame for the NPS pollution, 
such as pesticide or herbicide runoff or discarded waste in a storm water 
gutter, no one was held accountable.  But these problems did not signal 
the demise of WQS because ambient, cumulative impacts must be taken 
into account in order to adequately protect water quality. 
Congress continued to employ WQS in the CWA.87  Section 303 
requires each state to establish WQS for “waters” within the state.88  
WQS consist of two parts:89 (1) an identification and description of the 
 86. S. REP. No. 92-414 (1972), as reprinted in 1972 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3668. 
 87. Under the CWA, the EPA is obligated to promulgate WQS for states that fail 
to or inadequately do so.  Clean Water Act § 303(c)(3)-(4), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c)(3)-(4) 
(2000). 
 88. Clean Water Act § 303(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(c) (2000). 
 89. 40 C.F.R. § 131.10(a) (2003) provides: “Each State must specify appropriate 
water uses to be achieved and protected.”  40 C.F.R. § 131.6 (2004) outlines the 
minimum requirements for WQS submission.  The following elements must be included 
in each state’s WQS submitted to EPA for review: 
(a) Use designations consistent with the provisions of sections 101(a)(2) and 
303(c)(2) of the Act. 
(b) Methods used and analyses conducted to support water quality standards 
revisions. 
(c) Water quality criteria sufficient to protect the designated uses. 
(d) An antidegradation policy consistent with § 131.12. 
(e) Certification by the State Attorney General or other appropriate legal 
authority within the State that the water quality standards were duly adopted 
pursuant to State law. 
(f) General information which will aid the Agency in determining the 
adequacy of the scientific basis of the standards which do not include the uses 
specified in section 101(a)(2) of the Act as well as information on general 
policies applicable to State standards which may affect their application and 
implementation. 
Id.  




beneficial uses90 for the receiving waterbody, and (2) the water quality 
criteria (WQC) determined necessary to support the beneficial uses for 
that receiving waterbody.91  WQC identify the pollutant concentrations 
or levels above which beneficial uses are compromised.92  The receiving 
waterbody may not contain pollutants in excess of the applicable WQC 
needed to support the beneficial use.  The criteria typically are expressed 
either in numeric or narrative terms.93  When stated narratively, the 
vagueness problem identified above still exists. 
V.  CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 301: EFFLUENT LIMITS AND WQS 
The discharge of pollutants at the PS through the use of effluent 
amounts or limits is regulated pursuant to section 301.94  Effluent limits 
are prescribed by the EPA using nationally uniform, technology-based 
terms.95  Although effluent limits describe the amount of specific 
pollutants96 that can be legally released by the regulated source, and are 
set based on technological and economic considerations for particular 
discharge categories,97 the term “effluent limitation” is broadly defined 
 90. Typical beneficial uses include municipal and domestic supply, agricultural 
supply, groundwater recharge, contact water recreation, non-contact water recreation, 
marine habitat, wildlife habitat, and so on.  See, e.g., WATER QUALITY CONTROL PLAN, 
SAN DIEGO BASIN (9), 2-3 and 2-4 (1994). 
 91. 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(i) (2004).  The term “water quality objectives” may be used 
as a synonym for the federal term “water quality criteria.”  See, e.g., CAL. WATER CODE 
section 13050(h) (West 1992 & Supp. 2005), which provides: “Water quality objectives” 
are defined as “the limits or levels of water quality constituents or characteristics which 
are established for the reasonable protection of beneficial uses of water or the prevention 
of nuisance with a specific area.” 
 92. The CWA divides pollutants into three categories: toxic (Clean Water Act § 
307(a)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1317(a)(1) (2000)), conventional (Clean Water Act § 304(a)(4), 
33 U.S.C. § 1314(a)(4) (2000)), and non-toxic, non-conventional.  Any pollutant that is 
neither toxic nor conventional, fits within the non-toxic, non-conventional category.  
Clean Water Act section 303(c)(2)(B) requires states to adopt specific numeric criteria 
for all toxic pollutants on the EPA’s section 307(a)(1) list.  Two monitoring approaches 
in toxic regulation are used: a “chemical-specific” method, which relies on a chemical 
analysis of the discharge sample, and a “whole-effluent” method, which tests the toxicity 
of the entire discharge sample.  See generally WaterKeepers N. Cal. v. Cal. State Water 
Res. Control Bd., 126 Cal. Rptr. 2d 389 (Ct. App. 2002) (analyzing the California Toxics 
Rule). 
 93. 40 C.F.R. § 131.3(b) (2004). 
 94. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). 
 95. The EPA is responsible for establishing effluent limits for various types of 
point sources based on what the available technology could accomplish.  This approach 
avoided the technical difficulty of evaluating individual effluent limits.  JAMES SALZMAN 
& BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND POLICY 129 (2003). 
 96. Under the CWA, pollutants are classified in categories as being “conventional,” 
“toxic” (Clean Water Act §§ 301(b)(2), 307, 502(13)), or “non-conventional” (Clean 
Water Act § 301(g), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(g) (2000)).  See also supra note 43. 
 97. E.I. du Pont de Nemours & Co. v. Train, 430 U.S. 112 (1977) (holding, among 
other things, that effluent limitations for existing plant sources for 1977 and 1983 are to 
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in the regulations.  The term encompasses “any restriction . . . on quantities, 
discharge rates, and concentrations of ‘pollutants’ which are ‘discharged’ 
from ‘point sources’ into ‘waters of the United States.’”98  Consequently, 
effluent limits may be expressed as either numeric limits, which is 
traditionally the case, or in some instances as “best management 
practices” (BMPs).99
The second regulatory strategy is based on the use of WQS.100  
Applicable discharge limits are set in terms of the amount of pollutants 
allowed in a defined receiving waterbody.101  Consideration is given to 
local conditions, such as the beneficial uses of the receiving water and 
its assimilative pollutant capacity.  The waste discharge meets WQS 
requirements provided that the limits are not exceeded. 
The structure of the CWA reveals that the predominate strategy of 
Congress was to rely on effluent limits.  It did so for a number of reasons.102  
Uniform limits were deemed essential to achieving Congress’s national 
objectives.  They avoided the complex and divisive process of attempting to 
assess regional and local water impacts and prevented states from 
adopting weaker discharge limits for the purpose of encouraging the 
relocation of industry.  They also aided regulatory enforcement by tending 
to avoid complex issues of proof.  Unless the pollution treatment was 
technologically impractical or unachievable, compliance by the regulated 
dischargers was required regardless of evidence that a harmful effect had 
actually occurred. 
In addition to requiring technology-based limits, NPDES permits are 
required to include provisions requiring compliance with WQS.  Section 
301(b)(1)(C) provides: 
not later than July 1, 1977, any more stringent limitation, including those 
necessary to meet water quality standards, treatment standards, or schedules of 
compliance, established pursuant to any State law or regulations (under authority 
preserved by section 1370 of this title) or any other Federal law or regulation, or 
be set by regulation, and not on an individual basis during the permit issuance process). 
 98. 40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2004). 
 99. BMPs may be used when numeric effluent limits are infeasible (40 C.F.R.§ 
122.44(k)(3) (2004)) and when authorized under section 402(p) for the control of storm 
water discharges (40 C.F.R. § 122.44(k)(2) (2004)). 
 100. See Arkansas v. Oklahoma, 503 U.S. 91 (1991) (holding that the EPA’s 
requirement that NPDES dischargers must comply with downstream states’ WQS was a 
reasonable exercise of the agency’s statutory discretion pursuant to 33 U.S.C. §§ 1341, 
1342). 
 101. Clean Water Act § 303, 33 U.S.C. § 1313 (2000). 
 102. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Costle, 590 F.2d 1011 (D.C. Cir. 1978). 




required to implement any applicable water quality standard established 
pursuant to this chapter.103
This section, as well as the planning process outlined in section 
303(e)(3)(a), is designed to insure that NPDES permits protect WQS.  
EPA regulations prohibit the issuance of an NPDES permit when 
imposition of conditions cannot insure compliance with the applicable 
water quality requirements.104  The regulations also affirmatively require 
that an NPDES permit contain effluent limits as necessary to protect 
WQS.105
These WQS provisions were enacted prior to the adoption of section 
402(p) in 1987.  Whether they were superseded by the specific provisions 
dealing with MS4 storm water regulation is part of the continuing legal 
controversy analyzed below.   
VI.  CLEAN WATER ACT SECTION 402(P): INDUSTRIAL AND              
MUNICIPAL STORM WATER STANDARDS 
Section 402(p) establishes NPDES permit requirements for two categories 
of storm water discharge—industrial and municipal.  The statutory 
requirements for the two categories are different.  Industrial discharge 
permits “shall meet all applicable provisions of this section and section 
1311 (CWA section 301) of this title.”106  The two incorporating provisions 
from section 1311 (technology-based effluent limits107 and WQS108) apply 
to industrial storm water discharges. 
In contrast, MS4 discharge permits are governed by the following 
statutory provisions:109
 103. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 104. 40 C.F.R. § 122.4(d) (2004). 
 105. 40 C.F.R. § 122.44(d) (2004).  It provides that the NPDES permit “must 
contain effluent limits” for a particular pollutant “when the permitting authority 
determines . . . that a discharge causes, has the reasonable potential to cause, or 
contributes to an in-stream excursion above the ambient concentration of a state numeric 
criteria within a State water quality standard for an individual pollutant.”  Id. § 
122.44(d)(1)(iii). 
 106. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A) (2000). 
 107. Clean Water Act § 301(a), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (2000). 
 108. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2000). 
 109. One reason for the different set of standards relates to the wide-reaching nature 
of MS4 operations and the potential cost of regulating each MS4 point source.  The 
solution to this concern was the availability of system- or jurisdiction-wide NPDES 
permits.  Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(i), § 1342 (p)(3)(B)(i) (2000).  Congressman 
Rowland addressed the  potential financial impact on municipalities when he observed: 
The conference agreement, which includes a provision exempting certain 
storm water runoff from the NPDES permitting process takes a giant step 
toward reducing the regulatory burden proposed by the EPA.  As a result, the 
cost to local governments for complying with the act will be restrained.  Under 
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Permits for discharges from municipal storm sewers— 
 
 (i) may be issued on a system- or jurisdiction-wide basis; 
(ii) shall include a requirement to effectively prohibit non-stormwater 
discharges into the storm sewers; and 
(iii) shall require110 controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the 
maximum extent practicable, including management practices, control 
techniques and system, design and engineering methods, and such other 
provisions as the Administrator or the State determines appropriate for the 
control of such pollutants.111
 
While industrial storm water permittees are required to meet WQS and 
applicable technology-based effluent limitations,112 MS4 permittees 
generally are required to reduce “the discharge of pollutants to the 
maximum extent practicable (MEP).”113  The focus in subpart (iii) is on 
reducing the discharge at the output side (or PS), whereas the focus in 
subpart (ii) is on effectively controlling the input into the storm sewer 
conveyance system.  Taken together, these two provisions operate 
comprehensively and in tandem with one another, the latter dealing with 
discharges “from” the conveyance system and the former dealing with 
discharges “into” the conveyance system. 
current law, municipalities would be required to obtain permits for each of the 
millions of storm water discharge points across the country at a cost which 
would be almost impossible to meet per permit application.  It does not take a 
whiz at math to realize that our cities and towns were facing massive capital 
outlays; the cost could have easily exceeded $8.5 billion in expenditures for 
compliance with proposed EPA regulations for storm water discharge. 
132 CONG. REC. 31968 (daily ed. Oct. 15, 1986). 
 110. The mandatory nature of MEP is not in issue.  See Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. 
EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003) (“[W]e note that the plain language of § 402(p) of the 
Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p), expresses unambiguously Congress’s intent that 
EPA issue no permits to discharge from municipal storm sewers unless those permits 
‘require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent 
practicable.’”). 
 111. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B) (2000), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B) (2000). 
 112. Industrial dischargers are required to meet the provisions of § 1311 dealing 
with technology-based effluent limitations.  Section 1311 also mandates compliance with 
§§ 1312 (water quality related effluent limitations) and 1313 (water quality standards and 
implementation plans).  The net effect of these incorporating provisions is, among other 
things, to subject industrial discharges to compliance with both water quality effluent 
limits for the discharge and WQS.  The EPA has stated that BMPs are to be used in 
connection with water quality effluent limits, and that numeric limits are not required.  
See 61 Fed. Reg. 57,425-29 (Nov. 6, 1996), 65 Fed. Reg. 64,746-01. (Oct. 30, 2000). 
 113. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B)(iii), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (2000). 




The MS4 provisions do not contain any expressed reference to WQS.  
As a result, the relation, if any, between the MEP standard and WQS is 
not stated.114  While the relationship may not be stated, it is clear, 
however, that satisfying or meeting the MEP standard provides no 
assurance that WQS will in fact be met.  An MS4 permittee may satisfy 
an MEP discharge standard without meeting WQS.  As a result, the 
water quality of the receiving water may continue to degrade or exceed 
WQS notwithstanding compliance with MEP. 
In analyzing whether MS4 permittees may be subject to WQS 
limitations, one may contend that section 402(p) is clear.  MEP is expressed 
as the sole substantive limit applicable to MS4 permit conditions for 
discharges.  To the extent that WQS have any relevance, it may be argued 
that MEP trumps any situation when a conflict exists.  From the viewpoint 
of water quality protection, the problem is that MEP may not adequately 
protect the beneficial uses of the receiving water. 
VII.  MS4 DISCHARGE STANDARDS: THE LEGAL DEBATE 
The correct application of section 402(p) is not simply a technical 
quibble.  It directly affects the role of WQS and the realization of 
national water quality goals.  It also impacts regulatory enforcement 
practices because noncompliance with the MS4 permit requirements 
subjects the discharger to potential administrative civil liability and other 
penalties.115  If the MEP acts as the exclusive standard, proof of the 
violation requires the regulator or citizen complainant to establish that 
the MS4 permittee has not met the MEP standard.  This requires that 
additional “practicable” unused controls actually exist.116
In any enforcement proceeding, the litany of claims that additional 
controls are not “practicable” is apt to be constrained solely by the 
ingenuity of counsel.  One obvious problem is that MEP, standing alone, 
may simply create a toothless mandate not susceptible of meaningful 
enforcement.  When stated in quantitative terms, WQS have the 
advantage of providing a more certain standard for protecting water 
quality.  While the compliance benchmark is more certain, determining 
whether a discharge actually causes or contributes to a violation of WQS 
necessarily involves accurate monitoring of storm water flows rates, 
runoff amounts, and considerations of timing as well as ambient 
conditions. 
 114. The relation between MEP and effluent limits was also left uncertain.  
However, this question now has been examined in several administrative and judicial 
decisions. 
 115. See Clean Water Act § 309 (b)-(c), 33 U.S.C. § 1319(b), (c), (g). 
 116. See, e.g., 40 C.F.R. § 122.26(c) (2001). 
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The relationship between MEP117 and WQS was examined by the 
California Fourth District Court of Appeal in Building Industry Ass’n of 
San Diego County v. State Water Resources Control Board.118  In this 
case, the Building Industry Association (BIA) challenged the MS4 permit 
provision that prohibited storm water discharges that “cause or contribute to 
a violation of water quality standards.”119  The BIA’s principal theory120 
was that MEP is the exclusive standard under federal law, and that the 
Water Board could not require MS4 permittees to comply with state 
WQS.121
The Court of Appeal correctly upheld the permit condition prohibiting 
discharges in violation of WQS.  Given Congress’s intentional failure to 
define MEP for the purpose of granting flexibility to regulators in 
 117. Waste Discharge Requirements for Discharges of Urban Runoff from the 
Municipal Separate Storm Sewer System (MS4) Draining the Watersheds of the 
County of San Diego, the Incorporated Cities of San Diego County, and the San Diego 
Unified Port District, Order No. 2001-01, at D-3 (Feb. 21, 2001), 
http://www.waterboards.ca.gov/sandiego/programs/stormwater/sd%20permit/Order%2
0No.%202001-01%20Final%20with%20attachmentss.pdf.  The following definition of 
MEP is provided in Appendix D of the MS4 permit: 
MEP is the technology-based standard established by Congress in CWA 
section 402(p)(3)(B)(iii) that municipal dischargers of storm water (MS4s) 
must meet.  Technology-based limits establish the level of pollutant reductions 
that dischargers must achieve, typically by treatment or by a combination of 
treatment and best management practices (BMPs).  MEP generally emphasizes 
pollution prevention and source control BMPs primarily (as the first line of 
defense) in combination with treatment methods serving as a backup 
(additional line of defense).  MEP considers economics and is generally, but 
not necessarily, less stringent than BAT.  A definition for MEP is not provided 
either in the statute or in the regulations.  Instead the definition of MEP is 
dynamic and will be defined by the following process over time: municipalities 
propose their definition of MEP by way of their Urban Runoff Management 
Plan.  Their total collective and individual activities conducted pursuant to the 
Urban Runoff Management Plan becomes their proposal for MEP as it applies 
both to their overall effort, as well as to specific activities (e.g., MEP for street 
sweeping, or MEP for municipal separate storm sewer system maintenance).  
In the absence of a proposal acceptable to the SDRWQCB, the SDRWQCB 
defines MEP.   
The appendix also includes an excerpt from a memo dated February 11, 1993, 
entitled “Definition of Maximum Extent Practicable,” Elizabeth Jennings, Senior 
Staff Counsel, SWRCB. 
 118. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 Cal. 
Rptr. 3d 128 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 119. Id. at 134-35. 
 120. In an unpublished portion of the opinion, the court found the BIA’s additional 
contentions to be without merit.  Id. at 131. 
 121. Id. at 137. 




dealing with the storm water problem,122 the principle of judicial 
deference to the administrative determination is a useful starting point to 
analyzing the role of WQS.  Under certain circumstances, federal courts 
will defer to a federal agency’s interpretation of the statute it administers.  
In Chevron v. Natural Resources Defense Council,123 the Supreme Court 
set out a two-step judicial test for reviewing federal agency interpretations: 
When a court reviews an agency’s construction of the statute which it 
administers, it is confronted with two questions. First, always, is the question 
whether Congress has directly spoken to the precise question at issue.  If the 
intent of Congress is clear, that is the end of the matter; for the court, as well as 
the agency, must give effect to the unambiguously expressed intent of Congress.  
If, however, the court determines Congress has not directly addressed the precise 
question at issue, the court does not simply impose its own construction on the 
statute, as would be necessary in the absence of an administrative interpretation.  
Rather, if the statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue, the 
question for the court is whether the agency’s answer is based on a permissible 
construction of the statute.124
The two-step approach stated in Chevron has been used frequently by 
the courts.  It has been relied on by the Supreme Court in scores of cases 
since 1984, and applied by the circuit courts in more than a thousand 
cases.125
The role of Chevron and MS4 regulation was examined by the Fifth 
Circuit in City of Abilene v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency.126  In 
this case, plaintiffs challenged the EPA’s authority to condition MS4 
permits both on statutory and constitutional grounds.  Among other 
claims, the plaintiffs argued that the EPA’s interpretation of its authority 
under section 402(p) was not entitled to deference under Chevron.  The 
Fifth Circuit rejected this argument.  It reasoned, “[t]he plain language 
of § 1342(p) clearly confers broad discretion on the EPA to impose 
pollution control requirements when issuing NPDES permits. . . . 
Thus, even if Chevron deference is not warranted, the challenged permit 
 122. See supra note 29. 
 123. Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council, 467 U.S. 837 (1984) (holding that if 
Congress has not directly spoken to the precise question at issue, any agency 
construction must be affirmed as long as it is “reasonable”). 
 124. Id. at 842. 
 125. RICHARD J. PIERCE, SIDNEY A. SHAPIRO, & PAUL R. VERKUIL, ADMINISTRATIVE 
LAW AND PROCESS 376 (1999).  See Richard A. Posner, Legal Formalism, Legal 
Realism, and the Interpretation of Statutes and the Constitution, 37 CASE W. RES. L. 
REV. 179, 189 (1986) (“In our system of government the framers of statutes . . . are the 
superiors of the judges.  [They] communicate orders to the judges through legislative 
texts . . . .  If the orders are clear, the judge must obey them.”); see also Walton v. U.S. 
Consumers Club, Inc., 786 F.2d 303, 310 (7th Cir. 1986) (Easterbrook, J.)  (“Courts 
should confine their attention to the purposes Congress sought to achieve by the words it 
used.”). 
 126. City of Abilene v. EPA, 325 F.3d 657 (5th Cir. 2003). 
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conditions are within the EPA’s discretion.”127  The court’s point may be 
simply stated: The statute itself grants the necessary discretion to the 
EPA. 
In the BIA case, the parties did not rely on Chevron because a state 
administrative agency, the Water Board, was administering the MS4 
permit, not the EPA.  The state court turned to principles of deference 
under state law.128  Thus, it gave “appropriate consideration” to the Water 
Board’s statutory interpretation of the CWA that discharges in violation 
of WQS could be prohibited. 
Given the difficulty of determining the meaning of “appropriate 
consideration,” an analysis of the arguments underlying the claim of 
deference or appropriate consideration is warranted. 
 A.   The Plain Meaning Argument  
The starting point to any question of statutory construction is the 
language of the statute, in this case section 402(p).  The first step is to 
ascertain whether the agency’s action is consistent with Congress’s 
intent as expressed in the language used.129  If the statutory language is 
clear, the plain meaning of the statute controls.130  This principle is well 
recognized and beyond cavil. 
If the statute has not directly addressed the specific question, or the 
language is ambiguous or would produce an absurd result,131 or Congress 
has left the matter to agency discretion, the inquiry must go further.  In 
this situation, the question is whether the agency’s interpretation is based 
on a “permissible” construction of the statute.  In order to be a “permissible” 
construction, the agency’s interpretation of the statute need not be the 
 127. Id. at 660. 
 128. The Court of Appeal cited Chevron, but ultimately relied on Yamaha Corp. of 
America v. State Board of Equalization, 960 P.2d 1031 (Cal. 1998).  Bldg. Indus. Ass’n 
of San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 137 (Ct. 
App. 2004). 
 129. NORMAN J. SINGER, 2A STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 45.02 (5th 
ed. 1992).  United States Supreme Court Justice Frankfurter explained that the first step 
in interpretation was: “Read the statute.  Read the statute.  Read the statute.” John M. 
Kernochan, Statutory Interpretation: An Outline of Method, 3 DALHOUSIE. L.J. 333, 338 
(1976). 
 130. See Richard A. Posner, supra note 125, at 189 (1986). 
 131. Of course, no one favors an absurd result.  “[T]he Supreme Court has 
subscribed to the idea that judges may deviate from even the clearest statutory text when 
a given application would otherwise  produce ‘absurd results.’”  John F. Manning, The 
Absurdity Doctrine, 116 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2388 (2003). 




only possible construction: it simply must be reasonable and not arbitrary, 
capricious, or an abuse of discretion.132
Statutes, even those that are well drafted and seemingly clear, may 
lead to a variety of argued-for constructions.  Language, by its very 
nature, is a breeding ground for ambiguity.  Sometimes the ambiguity is 
intentional, whereas other times it appears to be recognized by counsel 
after the fact.  What is clear, however, is the fact that the legislative 
compromises that go into crafting the statutory language may not be 
stated or otherwise revealed.  Thus, it is not remarkable that what at first 
glance appears clear to one person may not be clear to another person. 
The CWA provisions dealing with MS4 regulation make no mention 
of WQS.  Unlike the CWA provisions applicable to industrial storm 
water discharges that expressly incorporate by reference the WQS 
provisions of section 301(b)(1)(C), no similar incorporating reference 
applies to MS4 discharges.  Accordingly, one may argue that the plain 
meaning of the MS4 statutory requirements precludes the use of WQS. 
The persuasiveness of the claim necessitates the parsing of section 
402(p) as it applies to MS4 regulation.  It provides that MS4 permits 
shall require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent 
practicable [MEP], including management practices, control techniques and 
system, design and engineering methods, and such other provisions as the 
Administrator or the State determines appropriate for the control of such 
pollutants.133
This language expressly gives the power to include “such other 
provisions” in the storm water permit that are determined appropriate for 
the control of pollutants.  While this grant of discretionary power is 
clearly stated, it still is not clear whether MEP should be construed to act 
as a substantive brake or limit on the use of WQS in the event that the 
discretion is exercised by the Administrator or the State. 
One might argue that MEP acts as a legal ceiling beyond which 
regulatory obligations may not be imposed.  In brief, the claim is that the 
“practicability” requirement of the MEP limits the exercise of the 
discretionary authority.  Thus, MS4 permit prohibitions on discharges that 
exceed WQS are not within the discretion authorized by Congress. 
This argument, which was summarily rejected by the Court of Appeal 
in the BIA case,134 is based on the claim that everything identified on the 
 132. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 58 (2003). 
 133. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) (2000) 
(emphases added). 
 134. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 
Cal. Rptr. 3d 128, 140 (Ct. App. 2004), (finding “unpersuasive Building Industry’s 
reliance on several statutory interpretation concepts, ejusdem generis, noscitur a sociis, 
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statutory “list” following the participle “including” is governed by the 
MEP requirement.135  In other words, the concept of MEP or 
“practicability” limits the listed categories ((1) management practices, (2) 
control techniques and system, design, and engineering methods, and (3) 
such other provisions determined appropriate to control pollutants).136
The core question of statutory construction is whether MEP governs 
the discretion granted in category (3): such other provisions determined 
appropriate to control pollutants.  In other words, does the “such other 
provisions” category, operate as an independent source of discretionary 
authority that is not limited by considerations of MEP? 
The Court of Appeal in the BIA case read the statutory language so 
that MS4 permits “shall require controls” subject to MEP, but a permit 
may also “require such other provisions” as deemed appropriate to 
control pollutants.  Notwithstanding the clarity of the court’s view, the 
claim that the plain meaning rule requires MEP to govern this category 
deserves closer examination because the decision is by an intermediate 
court of appeal.137  Recognized principles of statutory construction may 
be consulted to probe the persuasiveness of the argument that MEP is the 
controlling standard, including ejusdem generis (“of the same kind or 
class”), noscitur a sociis (“known by its associates”), and expressio 
unius est exclussio alterius (“the expression of one excludes others”). 
The principle of ejusdem generis extends or applies to those items in 
the included class or list.138  Under this principle, the general statutory 
term “controls”—NPDES permits shall require “controls” subject to 
MEP—governs everything embraced in the class “management practices, 
control techniques and system, design and engineering methods.”  
and expressio unius est exclussio alterius, to support its narrower statutory 
construction”). 
 135. This view may also support the argument that the use of any application of 
WQS is inappropriate regardless of whether it is tempered by MEP. 
 136. For convenience of analysis, I have presented the statutory references in three 
numbered groups.  The statute does not use this numerical system of grouping.  See 
supra note 133. 
 137. In Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159, 1164 (9th Cir. 1999), the 
Ninth Circuit found that the CWA “unambiguously demonstrates that Congress did not 
require municipal storm-sewer discharges to comply strictly with 33 U.S.C. § 1311 
(b)(1)(C).”  This finding does not address the issue of the independent discretionary 
authority granted by section 402(p). 
 138. Circuit City Stores v. Adams, 532 U.S. 105, 114 (2001) (observing ejusdem 
generis provides “‘[w]here general words follow specific words in a statutory 
enumeration, the general words are construed to embrace only objects similar in nature 
to those objects enumerated by the preceding specific words’”). 




Whether it also governs “such other provisions as the Administrator or 
the State determine appropriate” is not as obvious. 
The challenge to correctly applying ejusdem generis is defining the 
scope of the covered class.  Ejusdem generis does not define the class, 
thus other traditional constructional techniques may be employed to 
determine the inclusiveness or scope of the “same kind or class” 
requirement.  The principle noscitur a sociis (“known by its associates”) 
is often used in conjunction with ejusdem generis to accomplish this 
task.  Simply put, noscitur a sociis provides that the words, in this case 
the “such other provisions,” are known by their associates or by what 
surrounds it.  Meaning is given to the statutory terms by reference to the 
characteristics that it shares with the other things of the same kind, class, 
or nature.  While not an inescapable or dogmatic rule of construction, it 
may be applied when the words are capable of several meanings in order 
to avoid the giving of unintended breadth to the statutory language.139
The statute requires a permit to have “controls” that are subject to the 
legal standard MEP.  The “controls” subject to MEP include  “management 
practices “ and  “control techniques” and various “methods” identified in 
the statute.  For the purposes of applying the principle of noscitur a 
socii, these “controls” seem to share a point of commonality in that they 
all are arguably programmatic in nature. 
In contrast, the “such other provisions . . . for the control of such 
pollutants” is not programmatic.  Moreover, it is subject to a different 
legal standard—what the Administrator or the State “determines 
appropriate for the control of such pollutants.”  The fact that two legal 
standards (MEP and “determines appropriate for the control”) are 
identified supports the view that “such other provisions” does not share a 
point of commonality with the other members of the class. 
The “such other provisions” language also is distinguishable for 
another reason.  The “controls” subject to MEP are not discretionary, but 
are required by the statute: “shall require controls” subject to MEP.  In 
contrast, the permit may include “provisions” that are deemed appropriate 
to “control such pollutants.”  Thus, the application of ejusdem generis 
and noscitur a sociis supports the view that MEP ought not to be deemed 
the exclusive standard based on a plain meaning rationale. 
The “other provisions” language is different in kind for another 
reason.  The CWA sets the minimum requirements for water pollution 
control, leaving the states with authority to impose more stringent 
requirements under section 510 of the CWA.140  Section 510 recognizes 
 139. Jarecki v. G.D. Searle & Co., 367 U.S. 303, 307 (1961). 
 140. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000); see City of Albuquerque v. 
Browner, 865 F. Supp. 733, (D.N.M. 1993). 
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the power of states to adopt and enforce requirements on the discharge 
of pollutants that are stricter than those adopted under the federal law.141  
The claim that MEP is the exclusive standard conflicts with the grant of 
this discretionary authority.  The CWA authorizes, in fact encourages, 
states to assume responsibility for protecting receiving waters through 
the use of WQS.  Before divesting states of this authority, prudence as 
well as the respect for state sovereignty dictates that a clearer statement 
of congressional intent exist.142
The constructional guide “expressio unius est exclussio alterius” also 
may be consulted.  Industrial storm water permits are subject to WQS.143  
Thus, the argument goes, had Congress wanted WQS to apply to MS4 
permits, it would have done so, and the failure to do so implies that 
Congress intended to foreclose this possibility.  The difficulty with the 
argument lies in the fact that the negative implication is unwarranted.  
The MS4 statutory authority is given as a discretionary grant of power 
based on the standard of “appropriateness,” whereas the industrial storm 
water provisions require the use of WQS.  In short, implying that 
Congress intended to foreclose the use of WQS collides with Congress’s 
expressed grant of discretionary authority. 
B. Legislative History 
As a general matter, legislative history may be consulted to aid in 
determining Congress’s intent when the statutory language is susceptible 
to varying constructions.144  Unfortunately, the legislative history to 
 141. City of Milwaukee v. Illinois, 451 U.S. 304, 327 (1981). 
 142. In Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 
U.S. 159 (2001), the Supreme Court held that the Corps’ expansive regulatory 
interpretation of “waters of the United States” was not consistent with Congress’s intent 
as expressed in the CWA.  The Court offers the following guidance: “‘Unless Congress 
conveys its purpose clearly, it will not be deemed to have significantly changed the 
federal-state balance.’” Id. at 173 (quoting United States v. Bass, 404 U.S. 336, 349 
(1971)). 
The Court did not decide whether Congress had the power under the Commerce 
Clause to adopt such an expansive reading of “navigable waters.”  Nevertheless, the 
Court did reaffirm the proposition that Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause is 
not unlimited.  The argument  that MEP is the exclusive standard preempting more 
stringent state standards, based on Congress’s intent, invites the courts to resolve the 
federal-state balance constitutional question. 
 143. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(A) (2000) (this 
provision incorporates § 1311, which contains the WQS requirement). 
 144. The use of legislative history has been attacked by textualists, such as Justice 
Scalia, on the ground of unreliability.  See, e.g., Bank One Chicago v. Midwest Bank and 




section 402(p) is not especially illuminating to resolving the controversy.  
The legislative history is too brief and ambiguous to build a serious 
claim that Congress’s intent is clearly revealed outside the language 
actually used in the statute. 
The conference report on the Water Quality Act of 1986 contains a 
few brief generalized statements on the proposed legislation.  Senator 
Chafee observes that “the legislation assures compliance with a strong 
water quality standards [WQS] program and provides for great controls 
of toxic, conventional and non-conventional pollutants.”145  In referring 
to storm water controls, he comments that “[t]hese discharge requirements 
[contained in the proposed law] are to contain control technology or 
other techniques to control these [MS4] discharges and should conform 
to water quality requirements.”146  Whether he had WQS in mind is not 
entirely clear.  But it is a reasonable inference that he thought that 
conformance with WQS was expected. 
Senator Durenberger also provides a statement on storm water runoff 
proposal, which may tilt in the opposite direction.  He states: 
Any such [MS4] permit shall include a requirement to prohibit effectively 
nonstormwater discharges to municipal separate storm sewers.  Any such 
nonstormwater discharges to municipal separate storm sewers are currently 
illegal under the act [CWA]. 
    In addition, any such permit shall provide for compliance as expeditiously as 
practicable, but in no event later than 3 years from permit issuance and shall 
require controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent 
practicable.  Such controls include management practices, control techniques 
and systems, design and engineering methods, and such other provisions, as the 
Administrator determines appropriate for the control of pollutants in the 
stormwater discharge.”147
To argue that Senator Durenberger intended by his statement to cast 
MEP as the exclusive standard requires one to seize upon the punctuation 
separating the last two sentences of his statement.  By separating the 
concepts expressed in the last two sentences, one might suggest that 
“maximum extent practicable” was intended to control everything grouped 
in the last sentence.  This contention seems implausible.  It ignores the fact 
that he also recognized the importance of the broader goal of protecting 
water quality.  Elsewhere in the conference report, Senator Durenberger 
also recognizes that toxic and conventional storm water discharges could 
Trust Co., 516 U.S. 264, 277 (1995) (Stevens, J., concurring) (“Justice Scalia is quite 
right that it is unlikely that more than a handful of legislators were aware of the Act’s 
drafting history.  He is quite wrong, however, to conclude from that observation that the 
drafting history is not useful to conscientious and disinterested judges trying to 
understand the statute’s meaning.”). 
 145. 132 CONG. REC. S16, 435 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee). 
 146. 132 CONG. REC. S16, 436 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Chafee). 
 147. 132 CONG. REC. S16, 443 (daily ed. Oct. 16, 1986) (statement of Sen. Durenberger). 
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“adversely affect public health, harm fish and other aquatic species, and 
prevent or retard water quality improvements even if the best available 
pollution controls are installed on other point sources.”148
C.  The EPA’s Position on WQS 
As discussed in connection with Chevron,149 the EPA’s interpretation 
on the role of WQS is entitled to consideration.  In a 1991 memorandum 
issued by the General Counsel to the EPA, the agency took the position 
that the MEP standard was intended only to modify the technology-based 
effluent requirements of section 301, not the WQS requirements of 
section 301.150  The rationale was tied to the phase-in permitting schedule 
required by Congress.  Section 402(p)(4) directs compliance within three 
years after the issuance of the permit.151  The General Counsel explains: 
“‘In light of the express language, we believe the Agency may reasonably 
interpret the three-year compliance provisions in Section 402(p)(4) to 
apply to all permit conditions, including those imposed under [section] 
301(b)(1)(C) [WQS].’”152  Accordingly, the determination that the permit 
issuer must make at the time of permit issuance is that compliance with 
WQS will occur within three years. 
In 1996, the EPA reaffirmed the 1991 opinion of the General Counsel.153  
The EPA issued a policy notice outlining an interim approach for 
incorporating water quality-based effluent limitations154 into storm water 
permits in order “to provide for the attainment of water quality standards 
[WQS].”155  This approach was expressly intended to apply to both MS4 
discharges and industrial discharges.156
 148. Id. 
 149. See supra Part VII (discussing Chevron v. Natural Res. Def. Council). 
 150. Randy Hill & David Allnutt, “Wet Weather” Regulations: Control of 
Stormwater and Discharges From Concentrated Animal Feeding Operations and Other 
Facilities, in THE CLEAN WATER ACT HANDBOOK 174 (Mark A. Ryan ed., 2d ed. 2003). 
 151. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(4)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(4)(A) (2000). 
 152. In re Gov’t of the Dist. of Columbia Mun. Separate Storm Sewer System, 10 
N.P.D.E.S. 323, 342 n.22 (2002), available at http://epa.gov/eab/disk11/dcms4.pdf. 
 153. Hill & Allnut, supra note 150, at 174. 
 154. Clean Water Act § 502(11), 33 U.S.C. § 1362(11) (2000) (defining “effluent 
limitation” in terms of “quantities, rates, and concentrations of chemical, physical, 
biological or other constituents”). 
 155. Interim Permitting Approach for Water Quality-Based Effluent Limitations in 
Storm Water Permits, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,761 (Nov. 6, 1996). 
 156. Questions and Answers Regarding Implementation of an Interim Permitting 
Approach for Water Quality-Based Effluent Limitations in Storm Water Permits, 61 Fed. 
Reg. 57,425,  57,428 (Aug. 26, 1996). 




In the first round of storm water permits, BMPs were recommended, 
“and expanded or better-tailored BMPs in subsequent permits, where 
necessary, to provide for the attainment of water quality standards.”157  
The role for WQS was further recognized by the EPA in monitoring.  
Among other things, the storm water permit “should include” a monitoring 
program “to determine the extent to which the permit provides for the 
attainment of applicable water quality standards.”158
In a 1998 letter to the California State Water Resources Control Board 
dealing with a proposed draft for future California MS4 permits, the 
EPA (Region 9) reaffirmed the role of WQS: 
Our specific concern [with the proposed MS4 permit] is with . . . language 
which only regulates storm water discharges which ‘cause or substantially (in 
more than de minimis amount) contribute to a continuing or recurring 
exceedance’ of an applicable water quality standard.  We believe that qualifiers 
‘substantially (in more than de minimis amount)’ and ‘continuing or recurring’ are 
inconsistent with the Clean Water Act (CWA) and its implementing regulations.  
NPDES regulations at 40 CFR § 122.44(d)(1)(I) require effluent limitations in 
permits for ‘all pollutants or pollutant parameters . . . which the Director 
determines are or may be discharged at a level which will cause, have the 
reasonable potential to cause, or contribute to an excursion above any State 
water quality standard . . . .’159
Finally, delinking MEP from the WQS prohibition is consistent with 
the EPA’s Phase II regulations.160  Small MS4s are required to develop, 
implement, and enforce a storm water management program designed to 
meet the MEP standard and to “satisfy the appropriate water quality 
requirements.”161 Allowing regulators the discretion to impose a WQS 
prohibition on a Phase I MS4 permit is consistent with the Phase II 
regulations.  In contrast, the argument that such discretion for Phase I 
permittees is foreclosed by the application of MEP is inconsistent with 
the approach applicable to Phase II permittees. 
D.  Case Law 
Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner162 is the principal federal case 
dealing with the role of WQS in MS4 permits.  In this case, the Ninth 
Circuit considered whether the CWA requires numeric limits to ensure 
strict compliance with state-based WQS.  The court held that numeric 
 157. Interim Permitting Approach for Water Quality-Based Effluent Limitations in 
Storm Water Permits, 61 Fed. Reg. 43,761 (Nov. 6, 1996). 
 158. Id. 
 159. Letter from Alexis Strauss, EPA, Region 9, to Walt Pettit, California State 
Water Resources Board (Mar. 17, 1998) (on file with author) (emphases added). 
 160. See supra note 28. 
 161. 40 C.F.R. § 122.34(a) (2003). 
 162. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159 (9th Cir. 1999). 
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limits were not mandated.163  Defenders of Wildlife might be read, at least 
arguably, for the proposition that the section 402(p)(3)(B) provisions 
dealing with MS4 permits preempt the numeric limitations requirements 
as well as the WQS requirements found in section 301(b)(1)(C). 
The court rejected the claim that the numeric limitation requirements 
of section 301(b)(1)(C) applied to MS4 permits.  In doing so, it relied on 
the constructional principle that “an expression of one excludes others” 
(expressio unius est exclussio alterius).  The court reasoned that only 
industrial dischargers were expressly required by section 402(p)(3)(A) to 
comply with state WQS.164
The court reasoned that Congress knowingly drew the distinction it 
employed: “[W]e conclude that Congress’ choice to require industrial 
storm-water discharges to comply with 33 U.S.C. § 1311 [CWA § 301], 
but not to include the same requirement for municipal discharges, must 
be given effect.”165  The court noted that the statutory provisions applicable 
to MS4 permits replace “the requirements of § 1311 [CWA § 301] with 
the requirement that municipal storm-sewer dischargers ‘reduce the 
discharge of pollutants to the maximum extent practicable, including 
management practices, control techniques and system, design and engineering 
methods, and such other provisions as the Administrator . . . determines 
appropriate for the control of such pollutants.’”166  It also noted that the 
exemption from the requirements of § 1311 was not unusual because 
Congress had provided other specific exemptions in the CWA, such as 
return flows from agriculture and from oil, gas and mining operations.167
Some caution in the application of the Ninth Circuit’s reference to 
“replac[ing]”the requirements of section 301 is warranted.  The court 
seemingly conflates the two distinguishable components of section 301.168  
One component deals with mandatory use of numeric effluent-based 
limits, which was an issue squarely before the court.  The other 
component deals with WQS, either mandatory or discretionary, which 
may or may not have been directly at issue.169  The distinction between 
 163. Id. at 1166. 
 164. Id. at 1165. 
 165. Id. 
 166. Id. 
 167. Id. at 1166 (“Congress’s choice to exempt municipal storm-sewer discharges 
from strict compliance with § 1311 is not so unusual that we should hesitate to give 
effect to the statutory text, as written.”). 
 168. Clean Water Act § 301, 33 U.S.C. § 1311 (2000). 
 169. See infra text and accompanying notes 192-93. 




these components is significant because section 301, if it is “replaced,” 
seems to eliminate the general timetable for the achievement of 
important objectives, including “any more stringent limitation, including 
those necessary to meet water quality standards.”170
The distinction is important for another reason.  Even if one accepts 
the argument that the “replacing” language used by the court in 
Defenders of Wildlife should be read as rejecting the mandatory use 
of WQS in MS4 permits, the discretionary authority to use WQS is 
expressly granted.  The court finds that “[u]nder that discretionary provision, 
the EPA has the authority to determine that ensuring strict compliance 
with state water-quality standards is necessary to control pollutants.”171
For this reason, the EPA has announced that it will continue to follow 
the interim permitting approach based on the preservation of its 
discretionary authority to include WQS within the “other provisions” 
language of the statute.  The EPA announced in the final Phase II 
regulations that it “disagrees that section 402(p)(3) divests authorities of 
the tool necessary to issue permits to meet water quality standards.”172  
Thus, the EPA has affirmed its intent to continue issuing permits 
consistent with the Interim Permitting Policy based on its reading of its 
discretionary authority. 
This view on Congress’s grant of discretionary authority was recently 
endorsed by the California Fourth District Court of Appeal.  In Building 
Industry Association of San Diego County v. State Water Resources 
Control Board, the court held that the Water Board may require 
compliance with state WQS.173  The issue was squarely presented 
because the contested MS4 permit prohibits discharges “which cause or 
contribute to exceedances of receiving water quality objectives . . .” or that 
“cause or contribute to the violation of water quality standards . . .”174  
The court found that the Water Board was not limited by MEP 
considerations from prohibiting discharges that cause or contribute to the 
receiving waterbody exceeding applicable WQS. 
The challenged MS4 permit before the court triggers an “iterative” 
procedure for dealing with WQS violations.175  If a permittee discharges 
in violation of WQS, the permittee is required to prepare a report 
documenting the violation and describing a process for improvement and 
 170. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C) (2000). 
 171. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159, 1166 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 172. 64 Fed. Reg. 68,722, 68,787-88 (Dec. 8, 1999). 
 173. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 
Cal. Rptr. 3d. 128 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 174. Id. at 135 (emphasis added). 
 175. The full permit is available at http://www.swrcb.ca.gov/rwqcb9/programs/sd_ 
stormwater.html. 
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the prevention of further violations.176  But no “safe harbor” refuge 
exists as the permittee goes through the iterative process.177  An 
enforcement action for noncompliance with WQS is possible pursuant to 
the following permit provision: “Nothing in the section shall prevent the 
[Water Board] from enforcing any provision of this Order while the 
[permittee] prepares and implements the above report.”178
Should a WQS violation occur, the absence of a “safe harbor” 
provision creates some uncertainty for the permittee because the Water 
Board retains the discretion to take appropriate enforcement during the 
preparation and implementation of the report by the permittee.179  In the 
event of an enforcement action by the Water Board, several defenses 
would be available to the imposition of liability, including the degree of 
culpability, the susceptibility of abatement, and “other matters that 
justice may require,” which arguably would include the good faith 
actions taken during the iterative process.180  In addition, the Water 
Board could be asked to revise the applicable WQS, and its decision 
would be subject to normal administrative and judicial review.181
In upholding the prohibition on discharges that violate WQS, the 
California Fourth District Court of Appeal examined the relevant 
statutory language of section 402(p) and found that: 
As a matter of grammar and word choice, respondents [California] have the 
stronger position.  The second part of [the] Building Industry’s proposed 
interpretation—“control techniques and system, design, and engineering 
methods”—without a comma after the word “techniques” does not logically 
serve as a parallel construct with the “and such other provisions” clause.  
 176. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 135. 
 177. See supra note 113 (permit conditions C.2. and C.3). 
 178. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 135. 
 179. Some uncertainty exists due to the fact that a third party might bring an action 
under the federal citizen suit provisions of the CWA to enforce the WQS requirement 
should there be a “cause or contribute” violation.  Clean Water Act § 505, 33 U.S.C. § 
1365 (2000).  The state could choose to grant an offending permittee additional time to 
comply with the WQS requirement should the permittee be operating in good faith.  In 
such a case, the additional time granted to comply should be legally effective to 
foreclose the citizen suit until the expiration of the added time.  If the WQS requirement 
is imposed based on the exercise of discretionary authority, arguably the time for 
compliance might be extended on the same basis.  See Citizens for a Better Env’t v. 
Union Oil Co. of Cal., 83 F.3d 1111, 1119 (9th Cir. 1996) (finding that a water board’s 
cease-and-desist order, issued under Water Code section 13301, providing a deferred 
compliance schedule for selenium discharges, was an exercise of state’s prosecutorial 
discretion). 
 180. CAL. WATER CODE § 13385(e) (West 1992). 
 181. CAL. WATER CODE §§ 13320, 13330 (West 1992). 




Moreover, we disagree that the “and such other provisions” clause cannot be a 
direct object to the word “require.”  (§ 1342(p)(3)(B)(iii).)  Although it is 
not the clearest way of articulating the concept, the language of section 
1342(p)(3)(B)(iii) does communicate the basic principle that the EPA (and/or a 
state approved to issue the NPDES permit) retains the discretion to impose 
“appropriate” water pollution controls in addition to those that come within the 
definition of “‘maximum extent practicable.’” (See Defenders of Wildlife, 
supra, 191 F.3d at pp. 1165-1167.)  We find unpersuasive Building Industry’s 
reliance on several statutory interpretation concepts, ejusdem generis, noscitur a 
sociis, and expressio unius est exclussio alterius, to support its narrower 
statutory construction.182
E.  The Constructional Principle In Pari Materia 
The constructional principle in pari materia (part of the same 
material) counsels that legislation should be interpreted by the courts so 
that the respective parts of the law being construed are internally 
consistent.183  In the context of MS4 regulation, its application is based 
on the normative view that Congress was cognizant of the existing 
provisions of the CWA when it added section 402(p) in 1987.184  In 
deciding whether the “other provisions” language provides the discretionary 
authority to impose WQS independent of MEP, it is useful to consider 
whether such an interpretation is consistent with the general structure of 
the CWA. 
1.  Other Parts of Section 402(p) 
In focusing on the standards applicable to industrial and MS4 
regulation, the other provisions of section 402(p) should also be 
considered.  The standards do not exist in isolation. Congress established 
a permitting moratorium in section 402(p) for storm water discharges 
that took place prior to 1994.185  Permits were not required for discharges 
composed entirely of storm water.  During the permitting moratorium, 
the EPA was tasked with conducting certain studies.186  One task was 
to establish “procedures and methods to control storm water discharges to 
 182. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 139-40. 
 183. See, e.g., Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 711 (1996). 
 184. Water Quality Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, § 405, 101 Stat. 7, 69 (1987), 
amended by Water Development Resources Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-580, § 364, 
102 Stat. 4797, 4862 (1992). 
 185. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(1), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(1) (2000).  Prior to October 
1, 1994, storm water permits were not required.  The moratorium did not apply to  
(1) discharges already subject to NPDES permits, (2) industrial discharges, (3) large and 
medium municipal separate sewer systems, and (4) discharges significantly contributing 
to WQS violations. 
 186. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(5), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(5) (2000). 
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the extent necessary to mitigate impacts on water quality.”187  Thereafter, 
the EPA was to issue regulations “to protect water quality.”188
Congress also created an exception.  The above moratorium does not 
apply to a storm water discharge that the Administrator or the State 
determines “contributes to a violation of a water quality standard or is a 
significant contributor of pollutants to waters of the United States.”189  
Thus, discharges that violated WQS were required, and thus not exempt 
from the moratorium.  Some states took action by declaring unregulated 
storm water to be a “significant contributor” of contamination.190
Section 402(p)(2)(E)191 clearly states Congress’s special concern with 
protecting WQS, and in doing so, it draws no distinction between 
industrial and MS4 discharges.  The argument that Congress intended to 
make MEP the exclusive standard in the context of MS4 regulation is 
problematic when juxtaposed with these provisions.  One would have to 
maintain that Congress intended that WQS were to be relevant between 
1987 and 1994, but that thereafter only the less protective standard of 
MEP applied.  Without some arguable policy justification, this claim for 
the shift in policy from a “stricter” to a “less strict” standard seems, to 
put it charitably, curious at best.192  A more sensible construction is that 
Congress intended to continue, at a minimum, the discretionary authority 
to use WQS when the storm water discharge contributes to a violation of 
WQS. 
Section 402(p)(6) directs the EPA to develop a comprehensive 
program to regulate small MS4s.  In Environmental Defense Center,193 
plaintiffs argued, among other things, that Congress had not authorized 
the EPA to use NPDES general permits to implement the Phase II 
program for small MS4s.  The argument was based on the claim that 
section 402(p)(6) indicated the elements of the program without 
 187. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(5)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(5)(C) (2000). 
 188. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(6) (2000). 
 189. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C.§ 1342(p)(2)(E) (2000) (emphasis 
added). 
 190. See, e.g., Storm Water Enforcement Act of 1998, 1998 Cal. Stat. 998, § 1 
(“The Legislature hereby finds and declares . . . : (a) Unregulated storm water runoff is a 
leading cause of contamination of the state’s surface water and groundwater.”). 
 191. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(2)(E), 33 U.S.C § 1342(p)(2)(E) (2000). 
 192. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 
Cal. Rptr. 3d. 128, 142 (Ct. App. 2004) (characterizing WQS as a stricter standard than 
MEP). 
 193. Envtl. Def. Ctr., Inc. v. EPA, 344 F.3d 832 (9th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 541 
U.S. 1085 (2004). 




mentioning “permits,” and therefore Congress intended to foreclose use 
of a program based on NPDES general permits.194  The Ninth Circuit 
rejected the argument.  It reasoned that the fact that NPDES permits 
were not identified on the statutory list195 was not determinative because 
the list was manifestly intended by Congress to be nonexclusive.  The 
more reasonable construction, in the court’s view, was that Congress’s 
silence about the use of NPDES permits was an indication of its desire to 
give the EPA the flexibility to use them or not, rather than prohibiting 
their use. 
In many respects, the constructional issue is similar to the argument 
that MEP should be considered the sole standard.  Congress’s desire to 
grant the EPA flexibility to restore and maintain the integrity of the 
nation’s waters, which influenced the Ninth Circuit in Environmental 
Defense Center, applies with equal or greater force to Phase I permitting 
because Congress expressly authorizes the use of  “such other provisions” 
as deemed appropriate in section 402(p).196
2.  The NPDES Program 
As previously discussed, MS4 permits are NPDES permits.  Under the 
general provisions of the NPDES permit program, all NPDES permits 
are required to insure compliance with applicable water quality 
requirements.197  The claim that MEP is the exclusive standard deviates 
from the general requirements of the NPDES program. 
In Defenders of Wildlife, the Ninth Circuit determined that Congress 
intended to replace the requirements of section 301 with the 
requirements in section 402(p).198  As previously discussed, the court did 
not distinguish between technology-based effluent limits and WQS.199  
One reading of the court’s opinion might suggest that the replacement 
theory applies both to technology-based effluent limits and to WQS.  An 
alternate and narrower reading of the opinion is that Congress only 
intended to replace the numeric technology-based limits with best 
management practices (BMPs), which were then to be assessed for 
compliance by the MEP standard, and not WQS. 
But the Ninth Circuit also found that section 402(p) granted regulators 
the discretionary authority to use WQS.  One might argue that this 
 194. Id. at 844. 
 195. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(6), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(6) (2000) (listing 
performance standards, guidelines, guidance, and management practices and treatment 
requirements). 
 196. Clean Water Act § 402(p)(3)(B), 33 U.S.C. § 1342(p)(3)(B) (2000). 
 197. 40 C.F.R. 122.44(d) (2004) (water quality standards and state requirements). 
 198. Defenders of Wildlife v. Browner, 191 F.3d 1159, 1165 (9th Cir. 1999). 
 199. See supra notes 158–66 and accompanying text. 
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portion of the opinion dealing with WQS is dicta because the only 
question before the court was whether numeric limits were required in 
an MS4 permit, and thus the court’s opinion of the discretionary 
authority possessed by regulators was beyond the scope of the issue 
before the court.  This view misses an important consideration.  The 
intervenor-cities argued that the EPA could not, under the CWA, require 
compliance with WQS “through numerical limits or otherwise.”200 To 
the extent that “otherwise” was intended to foreclose the use of 
discretionary authority, the Ninth Circuit’s discussion ought not to be 
considered dicta because it directly addresses an issue raised by the 
intervenors. 
In the BIA case, the California Fourth District Court of Appeal 
characterized the Ninth Circuit’s discussion of discretionary authority as 
dicta.  Nevertheless, it went on to say, “[a]lthough dicta, this conclusion 
[on the discretionary authority to require strict compliance with WQS] 
reached by a federal court interpreting federal law is persuasive and is 
consistent with our independent analysis of the statutory language.”201  
Regardless of whether the Ninth Circuit’s view on discretionary 
authority is considered dicta, the present case law, although limited, 
supports the view that WQS may be used in MS4 permitting. 
3.  The CWA “Savings Provisions” 
Section 101(b) preserves and protects the primary responsibilities and 
rights of the states.  The declared policy of Congress is “to recognize, 
preserve, and protect the primary responsibilities and rights of States to 
prevent, reduce, and eliminate pollution, to plan the development and 
use (including restoration, preservation, and enhancement) of land and 
water resources.”202
The preservation of independent state authority also is recognized in 
section 510, which provides that nothing “shall preclude or deny the 
right of any State or political subdivision . . . to adopt or enforce (A) any 
standard or limitation respecting discharges of pollutants,” except to the 
extent that it might be less stringent.203  The claim that MEP forecloses a 
state from using WQS, which were characterized in the BIA case as 
 200. Defenders of Wildlife, 191 F.3d at 1166. 
 201. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n of San Diego County v. State Water Res. Control Bd., 22 
Cal. Rptr. 3d. 128, 143 (Ct. App. 2004). 
 202. Clean Water Act  § 101(b), 33 U.S.C. § 1251(b) (2000). 
 203. Clean Water Act § 510, 33 U.S.C. § 1370 (2000). 




“stricter” than MEP,204 would run counter to these “savings” provisions.  
It would also raise possible constitutional issues as to the power of 
Congress to do so.205
4.  CWA Section 401 
Section 401 requires any applicant for a federal license or permit that 
may result in “any discharge” to navigable waters to secure a certification 
that the discharge will comply with state WQS.206  The federal license or 
permit may not be issued without the certification, thus providing states 
with an effective veto of a project when WQS are not met. 
In PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Washington Dept. of Ecology,207 
the Court held that a state minimum instream flow requirement was a 
permissible section 401 condition for a proposed hydroelectric project 
on the Dosewallips River in Washington.  The state of Washington set 
the flow requirements to protect the river’s beneficial use as a fish 
habitat.  Thus, the protection of WQS has been recognized by the 
Supreme Court as a legitimate exercise of state prerogative under section 
401. 
Section 401 certification is triggered by “any discharge” to navigable 
waters.  Thus, the certification process applies regardless of whether the 
permit issuing authority is the EPA or state.  It would be strange public 
policy to require a federally issued storm water permit, which would be 
the situation when the EPA issues the MS4 permits, to be subject to 
WQS requirements through the 401 certification process but to foreclose 
a state that issues the MS4 permits from requiring WQS compliance.  
The better policy, based on furthering the integrated goals of the CWA, 
is to subject both to WQS requirements. 
5.  CWA Section 303(d) 
Section 303(d) contains the “total maximum daily load” (TMDL) 
program.  It is geared toward remediating water quality situations in 
 204. Bldg. Indus. Ass’n, 22 Cal. Rptr. at 142. 
 205. See Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook County v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 
531 U.S. 159 (2001) (avoiding the constitutional issue as to Congress’s power under the 
Commerce Clause, the Supreme Court observed that allowing the Corps to assert federal 
jurisdiction would impinge on the states’ traditional and primary power over land and 
water and raise “significant constitutional questions.”).  U.S. CONST. amend. X. (“The 
powers not delegated to the United States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the 
states, are reserved to the states respectively, or to the people.”). 
 206. Clean Water Act § 401, 33 U.S.C. § 1341 (2000). 
 207. PUD No. 1 of Jefferson County v. Wash. Dept. of Ecology, 511 U.S. 700 
(1994). 
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which the assimilative capacity of the receiving waterbody is exceeded.208  
In general terms, a TMDL is a calculation of the maximum quantity (or 
load) of a specific pollutant that may be added to the waterbody, if any, 
from all sources209 without exceeding the applicable WQS.  Thus, when 
WQS are not being met, dischargers210 may be required, pursuant to the 
TMDL program,211 to meet effluent control limits that are stricter than 
technology-based limits.212
For an impaired waterbody, the TMDL program sets the amount of 
identified pollutants that may be discharged without violating the 
applicable WQS.  As a matter of policy, using remedial strategies after 
WQS have been exceeded is a poor policy substitute to attacking the 
water quality problem before it demands remediation under the TMDL 
program.  Prohibiting discharges that cause or contribute to a violation 
of WQS may be seen as a proactive policy for protecting the beneficial 
use of the receiving water before triggering the remedial TMDL 
program.  At a minimum, allowing regulators the discretion to use WQS 
in the context of MS4 permitting is consistent with the policy objectives 
of the TMDL program. 
6.  CWA Section 319 
In 1987, Congress added section 319 establishing NPS management 
programs.213 Among other things, it requires states to identify navigable 
waters which, without additional action to control NPS pollution, cannot 
meet applicable WQS.214  While there are no specific permit requirements 
 208. See generally HOUCK, supra note 21. 
 209. The EPA has consistently called for the allocation of NPS within the TMDL 
program.  Id. at 61. 
 210. TMDLs apply to point source and nonpoint source discharges.  In Pronsolino 
v. Nastri, 291 F.3d 1123, 1140-41 (9th Cir. 2002), the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals 
ruled that CWA section 303(d) authorizes the EPA and the states to list and to establish 
TMDLs for waters impaired only by nonpoint sources. 
 211. Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d) (2000). 
 212. Clean Water Act § 301(b)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 1311(b)(1)(C)(2000); see also § 
1312 (2000).  It authorizes the EPA to establish water quality-related effluent limits 
whenever technology-based limits are insufficient to protect a specific portion of a 
waterbody.  The EPA often relies on the states to accomplish this task under the 
commonly referred to “303(d) list.”  Clean Water Act § 303(d), 33 U.S.C. § 1313(d). 
 213. Clean Water Act § 319, 33 U.S.C. § 1329 (2000). 
 214. Clean Water Act § 319(a)(1)(A), 33 U.S.C. § 1329(a)(1)(A) (2000).  The 
nonpoint source program requires state assessment reports to identify “best management 
practices and measures to control each category and subcategory of nonpoint sources . . . 
and to reduce, to the maximum extent practicable, the level of pollution resulting from 




established by section 319, this regulatory shortcoming is offset by the 
fact that most NPS dischargers in urbanized areas are subject to the MS4 
permit requirements of section 402(p).  Using the discretionary authority 
available to regulators to control MS4 discharges by prohibiting 
discharges that exceed WQS provides an effective strategy for dealing 
with the complexities of NPS pollution, thus reenforcing the policies 
stated by Congress in section 319.215
VIII.  CONCLUSION 
The National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) 
program of the Federal Clean Water Act (CWA) has been an important 
success story as it relates to the regulation and control of discharges of 
“point source” (PS) pollution.  Much has been accomplished in protecting 
the water quality of our nation’s waters.  Today’s challenge is effectively 
dealing with “nonpoint source” (NPS) pollution.  The need for effective 
storm water regulation lies at the heart of meeting the NPS challenge. 
Every state and every major watershed in the United States is under 
assault from unregulated or underregulated sources of NPS runoff.  
Contamination from storm water runoff has been characterized as being 
comparable to, if not greater than, contamination from PS pollution.  
This makes storm water runoff a leading source of water quality 
impairment of our nation’s waters. 
The effective regulation of municipal separate storm sewer system 
(MS4) conveyance systems is critical to dealing with the water quality 
impairment problem.  MS4 conveyance systems carry a toxic brew of 
dangerous anthropogenic wastes into local receiving waters across the 
United States.  Absent diversion to the sanitary sewer system, no 
treatment of the discharge occurs, so what goes into the MS4, comes out 
of it untreated.  This makes regulation of “separate” systems of central 
moment to the regulatory effort to protect water quality. 
The NPDES permit program regulates industrial storm water systems 
as well as MS4 systems.  The discharge “from” the MS4 system to 
navigable waters is the theoretical basis for the federal regulation of the 
MS4 as a PS.  Section 402(p) requires that permits  “shall require” 
controls to reduce the discharge of pollutants “from” the MS4 to the 
“maximum extent practicable” (MEP).  It also requires that MS4 permits 
comply with “such other provisions as the Administrator or the State 
determines appropriate for the control of such pollutants.”  On the input 
such category, subcategory, or source.” Clean Water Act § 319(a)(1)(C), 33 U.S.C. § 
1329(a)(1)(C) (2000). 
 215. JAMES SALZMAN & BARTON H. THOMPSON, JR., ENVIRONMENTAL LAW AND 
POLICY 140 (2003). 
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side of the conveyance system, section 402(p) requires MS4 permits to 
effectively prohibit nonstorm water discharges “into” storm sewers. 
The statutory fit between MEP and the discretionary grant of power 
under the “such other provisions” language of section 402(p) has created 
a breeding ground for legal disagreement as well as regulatory uncertainty.  
Because the economic and environmental stakes are high to permittees, 
which are typically local government, as well as to the building industry, 
environmentalists, and regulators, MS4 regulation has fomented legal 
controversy.  More litigation can be expected to test this legal fit as 
regulators increasingly prohibit MS4 discharges that cause or contribute 
to the violation of Water Quality Standards (WQS). 
One view is that MEP should be treated as the sole substantive permit 
limit.  This view rejects the argument that WQS have any role to play in 
MS4 regulation.  Stated more robustly, MS4 permit prohibitions based 
on WQS ignore Congress’s direction by reading the “practicable” standard 
out of the statute.  In short, the statutory trump card is practicability, not 
WQS. 
In this article, I have argued that MEP ought not be considered the 
exclusive regulatory standard.  I maintain that regulators have the 
discretionary authority to prohibit MS4 storm water discharges that 
cause or contribute to a violation of WQS.  When this authority is 
exercised, WQS operate as a legal floor above which MEP efforts should 
be assessed for purposes of determining permit compliance.  I argue that 
this view is consistent both with Congress’s intent and the traditional 
role assigned to WQS.  Because WQS provide a clearer standard for 
protecting water quality, I also maintain that it promotes greater regulatory 
certainty for enforcement purposes.  In the final analysis, my view is that 
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